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Local law enforcement agencies’ role in combating terrorism should center on crime 
reduction. The crime fighting energy recovered from lowering crime can be converted to 
proactive efforts, which can root out precursor acts related to the planning and execution 
of domestic and international terrorism as an operational byproduct. To achieve this local 
momentum information and intelligence Sense-making within a common operating 
picture, offering real-time situational awareness can be the key difference in gaining or 
sustaining the crime reduction, starting this flywheel effect. 
By allowing function to follow form within a supporting technology, the 
V2I2SION process allows a more objective approach to format information sharing by: 
Validating an offense to expend the best return on time; Visualization in real-time versus 
delayed mapping; Information-to-Intelligence by effective case management - and crime 
bulletin construction and viewing in real-time; moving toward Solutions and debriefed 
Intelligence for future Sense-making; and leading to Optimization and the Next action. A 
pilot solution named Situational Awareness for Enforcer’s Common Operating Picture 
(SAFECOP) was tested during the 2012 Republican National Convention and showed 
promising results against an event-strained agency’s resources; which is comparable to 
either a crime reduction plateau or loss of personnel due to localities’ budget restraints.     
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“When anyone speaks, it should be like words of God. When anyone ministers, it 
should be from the virtue that God provides, so that in all things God may be honored 
through Jesus Christ. To him is glory and dominion forever and ever. Amen.” 
1 Peter 4:11 
To my beautiful wife, Mary, and our wonderful children, Olivia, Zoë, Zane, and 
Zeta: Thank you for the collective sacrifices you have made—to make our home, our 
community and our country that much safer. 
“No one who has sacrificed home, spouse, brothers and sisters, parents, 
children—whatever—will lose out. It will all come back multiplied many times over in 
your lifetime. And then the bonus of eternal life!” 
Luke: 18:29–30 
To my law enforcement and academic mentors: Thank you for leadership and 
guidance in the small things, and your friendship and support in the big things. 
“If you have faith as small as a mustard seed, you can say to this mulberry tree, 
‘Be uprooted and planted in the sea,’ and it will obey you.” 
Luke: 17:6 
To my family and friends in faith: “Work (hard) as if everything depended on 
you. Pray (knowing) everything depends on God.” 
Adapted from Saint Augustine 
“Be strong and courageous. Do not be afraid or terrified because of them, for the 










A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
This thesis asserts that there are certain crimes that demonstrate a precursory link 
to domestic or international terrorism. Logic would then suggest if a local police agency 
is performing all crime reduction well, it can subsequently deter, detect, and ultimately 
disrupt these crimes, which would have a direct effect on the terrorists who are in the 
planning or execution phase. Fighting local crime well equates to having an impact on 
domestic and international terrorism. 
Information and intelligence sharing is as old as war itself, and war, in this case, is 
analogous to crime and terrorism. The noise, or meaningless data, that exists before the 
actual useable or raw data, must be filtered for information, and then elevated to 
knowledge, and finally wisdom—which many agencies call their best practices. The best 
opportunity for this is to develop a common operating picture that unifies the proven case 
management processes within a real-time, situational awareness platform. 
Because a common operating picture creating the situational awareness can be 
steadily fed by the tactical and analytical layers of a policing agency, the intangible 
benefit of varying levels of line and management/command experience and functionality 
are creating a mosaic that transcends other means of linear and inconsistent 
communication. Such as the case with the New York Police Department’s (NYPD) 
CompStat, this can create an operational efficiency within an organization and potentially 
lower crime and terrorism.1  The goal would be to do the process more quickly and bring 
it closer to the front lines. 
The commonly appearing theme in all neo-CompStat, local law enforcement 
agencies (those that have adopted and progressed directly through the use of computer 
statistics) is that they develop their strategies around crime reduction. If they assertively 
                                                 
1 William Bratton, “Cutting Crime and Restoring Order: What America Can Learn from New York’s 




solve crime, they have an opportunity to deter, detect, and disrupt terrorism simply by 
doing their job effectively. There are approximately 18,000 law enforcement agencies in 
the United States who employ over 1.1 million of law enforcers working in the state and 
local communities.2 
It has been shown that precursory crimes that are linked to the planning and 
execution of terrorism happen locally in relation to the actual target. These include acts 
such as illegitimate financing activity, surveillance of suitable targets, probing security, 
acquiring supplies, suspicious activity, performing “dry runs,” and up to the deployment 
of personnel and tactical assets. This gives local law enforcement officers a tremendous 
opportunity to do their job in fighting crime—and possibly terrorism—simultaneously. 
To fight crime effectively, the state and local agencies need technology in the 
form of a common operating picture (COP) that produces real-time situational awareness 
(SA) through normal activities. It is this proposed process that will allow the hard work, 
in the detailed, daily effort, to afford our nation the best chance to further reduce crime, 
through the sharing of real-time information and intelligence, as well as deterring, 
detecting and potentially disrupting the planning and execution of terrorism. 
Existing research establishes that while all crime may not be motivated by 
planning or funding for future acts of terrorism, some is. If this is established, then by 
fighting all crime well, at the lowest common denominator and regardless of motive, 
countering terrorism is a natural derivative.  
Regardless of the terrorism effect, the theoretical solution would be evaluated for 
success if sharing information and intelligence in a more consistent and timely manner 
could have an impact on local crime fighting. Again, if through a technological solution it 
is proven that police work is more efficient, causing crime reduction, then the positive 
influence established in the precursory crime nexus to terrorism reaps the benefit by 
doing the local crime fighting mission well. 
                                                 
2 Brian A. Reaves, “Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 2008,” (NCJ 233982), 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2216 (accessed September 




This thesis will attempt to generate a recommendation, via a technological 
solution, to improve the communication and crime fighting process, while asserting that 
local crime reduction has a nexus to detect, deter, and disrupt terrorism activities. 
B. REASEARCH QUESTION 
How could real-time, situational awareness technology and case management, in a 
single common operating picture, improve the ability of local police to detect, deter, and 









II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Four areas of relevancy were examined and analyzed as part of this literature 
review. The first applies to technology itself, specifically focusing on the socio-
technological perspective. The next two sections relate to the power of situational 
awareness in dynamic environments and strategic thinking as sense-making. The final 
review examines the nexus value between crime and terrorism, as well as the 
opportunities to have an impact at a local policing level. 
B. TECHNOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY IN LAW ENFORCEMENT: A 
VALUE ANALYSIS 
It is often said that one must be a responsible man or woman before becoming a 
policeman or policewoman. Using a similar approach, chapter six of Charity in Truth, 
entitled “The Development of People and Technologies,” addresses technology before 
deciding it has value in a common operating picture and supplied as a situational 
awareness platform in law enforcement: 
Technology enables us to exercise dominion over matter, to reduce risks, 
to save labor to improve our conditions of life. It touches the heart of the 
vocation of human labor: in technology, seen as a product of his genius, 
man recognizes himself and forges his own humanity. Technology is the 
objective side of human action whose origin is found in the subjective 
element: the worker himself.3  
The author continues, “Technological development can give rise to the idea that 
technology is self-sufficient when too much attention is given to the ‘how’ questions, and 
not enough to the many ‘why’ questions underlying human activity.”4 
The focus is on the objective and subjective side of the equation. Police officers 
come to work each day facing a myriad of data and information. As each shift changes, 
                                                 
3 Benedict XVI, “The Development of Peoples and Technology,” in Charity in Truth (Boston, MA: 
Pauline Books and Media, 2009), 104. 




information gets lost in the process. Additionally, new information is added to what was 
already accumulated. The criminals (and terrorists) thrive, not only on the slippage of 
information and intelligence transfer between incoming and outgoing shifts, but also on 
the slippage that occurs when information does not get shared between geography and 
various jurisdictional layers. 
It is probably too critical to say that it does not get shared at all; however, it’s not 
quickly enough. Technology has dramatically improved information and intelligence 
sharing in all levels of law enforcement. An example of this is Computer Statistics 
(CompStat), which was founded by NYPD in 1994 and is prevalently used in small, 
medium, and large agencies throughout the country.5  CompStat is referred to as a 
strategic control system designed to disseminate information on crime challenges and 
track efforts to combat them. Though it is shorthand for NYPD and other agencies, it 
tends to reside at the managerial levels of organizations that embrace it.6  Officers of 
many agencies also use in-car computers to manage their information, as well as receive 
calls for service, enter reports, and query information in an online records management 
system (RMS). 
Somewhere between CompStat—which creates command and managerial 
accountability typically on a monthly basis on all or some of the geographic segments of 
a local jurisdiction—and the routine shift change—which can happen two to three times 
a day depending on an agency’s deployment—there is a gap equating to the right amount 
of information that can be shared to shift the wisdom momentum to the law enforcers. 
After all, data becomes information, which becomes knowledge, then understanding, and 
then ultimately elevates to wisdom, which allows some officers to do things like beat 
criminals back to their residence before they can get inside and hide their spoil.7 
                                                 
5 Nicole Billante, “The Beat Goes On: Policing for Crime Prevention,” Issue Analysis, no. 38 (July 1, 
2003). 
6 David Weisburd, Stephen D. Mastrofski, Rosann Greenspan, and James J. Willis, “The Growth of 
CompStat in American Policing,” Police Foundation Reports (April 2004). 
7 Gene Bellinger, Durval Castro, Athony Mills, “Data, Information, Knowledge and Wisdom,” 




We (police as part of society) must keep asking ourselves why we want more 
technology, versus trying to get more simply for the sake of more. Focusing on the why 
more than simply the how can lead us farther down the proper path of progress. 
Subsequently, also this enables avoiding the slippery slope of not being able to sustain all 
technological components or how to make sure they are physically or industrially 
synthesized into the mission.  
Eccles and Groth, discuss their socio-technology theory about using technology 
for problem solving, “Technology can be designed or implemented so poorly that the 
workload cost is greater than the workload saving.”8 
This corroborates the “why versus how” in the previous paragraph, and how, more 
importantly than just why, should be the question, “Does a new technology improve 
communication and coordination and make the work group more efficient?” 
Eccles and Groth continue arguing their position by referencing support from 
Hoffman, Hayes, Ford, and Hancock, who advocate that advancement in technology 
tends to be driven from within the technology and possibly missing or not giving enough 
attention to the humans that use the technology or the that problems the human agent 
might face.9  These researchers suggest that technological innovation should be centered 
on human- and problem-centered design instead of sheer advancements in the technology 
itself.10 
C. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 
1. General Situational Awareness 
Wayne Gretzky is regarded as the greatest hockey player ever.11  He obtained this 
distinction based on his results, including scoring over 200 times in a single season and in 
                                                 
8 David W. Eccles and Paul T Groth, “Problem Solving Systems Theory: Implications for the Design 
of Socio-technological Systems,” Cognition and Learning 3 (2006): 323–343. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Encyclopedia Britannica, s.v. “Wayne Gretzky,” 2008, 




over six seasons—a feat that has never been rivaled.12  Despite the critiques of his small 
size, lack of strength and speed, he could consistently anticipate where the puck was 
going to be and execute the right move at the right time.13  One could argue that Wayne 
Gretzky mastered situational awareness. 
2. Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) 
According to the Army Field Manual 1–02, situational awareness is: 
Knowledge and understanding of the current situation which promotes 
timely, relevant and accurate assessment of friendly, competitive and other 
operations within the battlespace in order to facilitate decision making. An 
informational perspective and skill that fosters an ability to determine 
quickly the context and relevance of events that are unfolding.14 
In the 1990s, the Office of Net Assessment, Department of Defense, coined a 
phrase “revolution in military affairs” (RMA).15  This phrase was defined as a “major 
change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of 
technologies, which combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine, and 
organizational concepts, alters the character and conduct of operations.”16 
In his paper The Revolution in Military Affairs: A Canadian Perspective, Major J. 
Craig Stone of the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College also examines the 
theoretical writing on the RMA.17 He found the notions of information dominance and 
the information age is tied to the ability to process information faster and to have 
situational awareness on the battlefield.18 These notions are considered by many to be  
                                                 
12 Encyclopedia Britannica, s.v. “Wayne Gretzky.” 
13 Frank Orr, “Gretzky, Only 16, Carries a ‘Gold-Orr’ Label,” The Sporting News, January 19, 2008. 
14 Eric S. Toner, “Creating Situational Awareness: A Systems Approach, 2009, http://www.upmc-
biosecurity.org/website/resources/publications/2009/2009–06–10-SituationalAwarenessSystemsApproach 
(accessed May 21, 2012). 
15 Robert Addinall, “Information in Warfare from Sun Tzu to the War on Terror” (dissertation, Royal 







one of the defining characteristics of RMA. Military innovation is generally discussed in 
the context of types of innovation-peacetime versus wartime, technological versus 
doctrinal, and evolutionary versus revolutionary.19 
3. CompStat 
Whether in military combat or local law enforcement policing a community, 
situational awareness is paramount to consistent success. The New York Police 
Department (NYPD) is credited since 1994 with developing and using Computer 
Statistics (CompStat) as an accountability system for police leadership. This CompStat 
system allowed situational awareness to matriculate from strategic analysis, at a 
command and managerial level, to understandable actionable information to use at a 
tactical level. Within an environment of situational awareness, the fruits of this exchange 
allow: 
1. Crime deterrence by increased presence in the appropriate areas;  
2. Patrolling of identified crime hotspots; and  
3. Targeting the few offenders that have shown responsibility for a majority of 
the crimes.20 
4. Ideological Offense and Ideological Defense 
To continue to more deeply evaluate the value of situational awareness in the 
battlefield (crime community), European Enlightenment philosopher Niccolo Machiavelli 
attempts to clarify the role of ideological offense and ideological defense as information 
operations in different layers.21  The layer that relates to situational awareness indicates 
that the nature of society and the nature of military (police) activity are inextricably 
linked, and for the people to be involved, they need to be aware.22   
                                                 
19 Addinall, “Information in Warfare.” 
20 Billante, “The Beat Goes On.”  





To modernize and localize this concept, we fast forward to today in Tampa, 
Florida and quote the current police chief, Jane Castor, who commonly says to the 
community, “There are over 340,000 of you [citizens] and only 1,000 of us [police]. You 
are going to reduce crime with our assistance, not the other way around.”  The 
undervalued or understated component of progressive success in NYPD, as well as many 
successful jurisdictions, might be that they have increased the communities’ situational 
awareness about crime in addition to that of the police departments. NYPD posts its 
crime statistics by precinct on a weekly basis.23  Many agencies use Web-based crime 
mapping, whether commercial or government grade, to share with the community, not 
just for geospatial crime awareness, but to allow anyone with information to 
anonymously share that crime tip with the authorities. This allows for greater situational 
awareness in the community. Greater situational awareness in the community parlays into 
greater crime reduction since there are many more citizens (than law enforcement 
officers) to be information and intelligence collectors and sharers. 
5. Speed Cycle 
Another gap in local law enforcement’s situational awareness is the speed cycle of 
crime data. In Samuel B. Griffith’s introductory essay in Sun Tzu’s Art of War, he 
discusses “speed” as one of three underpinnings of tactics and strategy.24  While the 
essay did not distinguish ground speed from the speed of information, the focus here will 
be on the latter. For example, many agencies host their CompStat meetings on a monthly 
basis, but the data from the previous may have become stale. By using technology, with a 
common operating picture, situational awareness can become real-time and closer to the 
tactical level, thereby increasing the speed of information and intelligence. Invalidated 
data, although fast, can also be a challenge.   
There are many technological solutions at present that share data at the computer-
aided-dispatch (CAD) point, and also after the records management process. These are 
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both too fast (invalid crime data via CAD) and too slow (after the records processing  
cycle occurs). By being part of the validation process, or ensuring a valid offense has 
occurred, a potential case-ownership connection within a solution could outweigh the 
mere technology alone.  
In 2011, at a Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) one-day workshop, police 
chiefs from around the country (typically from large and medium sized agencies) spoke 
about their CompStat utilization.25  Many referenced a monthly session. Any agency that 
has achieved success in their jurisdiction now realizes that if the monthly CompStat 
meeting is the only situational awareness conveyed, then it is strategic versus tactical and 
actionable and, therefore, too slow. While a monthly meeting can show trends and assist 
with strategic planning, absent real time situational awareness, the front lines are fighting 
blind at the tactical level.26     
6. Space Situational Awareness 
Johnston, Lewis, Hart, White, and Cox illustrate an operational comparison of 
situational awareness, demonstrating a more tactical and actionable approach in their 
discussion of space situational awareness (SSA) using a cloud-based architecture for 
significant risk associated with satellite operations.27  While navigating satellites around 
what they define as the low earth region’s (LEO), bit of debris ranging in the millions, is 
not a direct comparison with law enforcement’s need for real-time situational 
awareness—there is a distinct parallel in that law enforcements needs SSA to make 
timely decisions as well. 
Johnston et al., further argue that cloud computing allows resources, software, 
data, and other services need to become available on demand through an Internet-based 
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system.28  Law enforcers need to see crime patterns, offender bulletins, criminal 
histories, neighboring agency risk, and a myriad of other information and intelligence on 
a moment-by-moment basis. This, by comparison, is their version of space debris. 
Information accuracy, speed, and reliability in the field can ultimately improve 
line level situational awareness for the tactical decisions that need to be made. Bridging 
time (shifts/days off) gaps, as well as providing geospatial, temporal, and timely analysis 
can accelerate the situational awareness. This can reduce crime by bringing the 
opportunity to prevent or rapidly identify offenders committing crimes, which can then 
assist in the discovery of those precursory offenses related to acts of terrorism. The closer 
and faster the situational awareness is to the event, the better the options might become. 
D. STRATEGIC THINKING AS SEEING AND SENSE MAKING IN CRIME 
FIGHTING AND COMBATING TERRORISM 
1. Strategic Fallacies 
An excerpt from Henry Mintzberg’s 1994 The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning 
mentions: 
One day in 1943, Edwin Land’s three-year-old daughter asked why she 
could not immediately see the picture he had just taken of her. Within an 
hour, this scientist conceived a camera [Polaroid] that would transform his 
company. This was a synthesis of the insight invoked by his daughter’s 
question and his vast technical knowledge.29 
Even beyond the synthesis of insight and technical knowledge, it was a 
combination of caring about his daughter’s vision combined with his creativity to allow 
her and eventually others’ insights to become reality. This same approach can be used to 
solve crime today faster than yesterday. Why should law enforcement agencies wait until 
analysts build maps after the records management process occurs and then wait for 
managers to interpret these maps into an actionable deliverable to combat a current 
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criminal pattern or trend?  Why cannot crime be validated, mapped, and visualized 
immediately then crowd sourced for faster case solving?  With dozens of officers and 
sometimes hundreds working the ground every day, why should a commander or analyst 
inside an air conditioned office be driving the next strategic move instead of the officers 
working the street?  This, too, would be a realization and synthesis of a vision based on 
caring about today and tomorrow’s crime victims, similar to the Polaroid camera 
mentioned earlier, using the technical expertise to improve information and knowledge 
flow. 
a. The World at Still 
Mintzberg continues by announcing three fallacies of strategic planning.30 
The first fallacy describes how the world is supposed to remain still while plans are being 
developed, essentially saying that prediction is not possible. Everyone in the CompStat 
arena appreciates the business and managerial accountability that CompStat has brought 
to crime fighting. However, it must be recognized that, if CompStat is the only process 
being used in an agency today and especially just on a monthly cycle, then nobody is 
talking about crime patterns for 30–45 days.  
Professor Rodrigo Nieto-Gomez of the Naval Postgraduate School once 
shared that he, too, disagrees with the predictive policing buzz saying that it is more 
about the explicative data.31  An agency can aggregate a posteriori data into a predictive 
view but nobody can tell someone where and when the next burglary or homicide is 
going to take place. However, if prediction is not possible, Sun Tzu says “speed” is 
possible.32 
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b. Detached Management from Operations 
The next fallacy described by Mintzberg deals with management needing 
to be detached from operations.33  This is similar to the initial step of the intelligence 
process where requirements are derived at the administrative levels before the collection, 
processing, exploitation, analysis, dissemination, consumption, and feedback take place 
from the vantage points in the field. Arguably, this is similar to the concept of brick and 
mortar fusion. The view from inside does not show the disconnect from the field, but the 
view from the field gives tremendous clarity to what the gaps are in the lack of 
knowledge transfer and information flow. Bring that fusion to the police officers in real 
time by allowing them to create their own process and then watch the opportunities 
become unveiled. Mintzberg’s section on the second fallacy concludes with vision not 
being available to those who cannot see with their own eyes and that real strategists get 
their hands dirty looking for nuggets that become the next strategy.34  This requires daily 
immersion. 
c. Failure of Systems 
Mintzberg’s final fallacy describes the failure of systems, presuming that 
these systems offer a level of artificial intelligence and an opportunity to replace or 
enhance human intuition.35  The best part of this section describes the opportunity for a 
more realistic ability to process and expose more information but allow the humans to 
internalize it, comprehend it, and synthesize it.36  In Howard Gardner’s book, 5 Minds for 
the Future, he cites one [mind] being the synthesizing mind that can work with the other 
four—a disciplined mind, a creative mind, an ethical mind, and a respectful mind.37 In 
this learning space, the blending information with the human minds allows things get 
tried and tested, and those positive experiences become ingredients for new strategies in a  
                                                 









dynamic learning environment. While a system might elevate the baseline of information 
and knowledge, especially in a crime fighting space, it takes the actual officers to 
synthesize the information and make it applicable. 
2. Sense-making 
Brenda Dervin, Professor of Communications at Ohio State University, offers a 
view that knowledge is the sense made at a particular point in time-space by someone.38  
This, coupled with the work of Henry Mintzberg discussing strategic thinking as seeing, 
seems to be two great ingredients to create the situational awareness required in the ever-
dynamic realm of crime fighting and terrorism prevention.39 
In her Sense-making approach, Dervin continues as she describes knowledge 
transforming from a noun to a verb—always an activity embedded in time and space.40  
Solving crime is always an effort in a world of gaps. Somewhere between the historical 
crime trends and new offenses occurring and being solved; lay potential witnesses, 
forensics, modus operandi, investigator’s experience, offender management, and case 
management. If knowledge in this equation can be described as connecting the 
information to achieve a potential solution, the ability to crowd source an answer must be 
a better opportunity than to harvest the information and investigate a crime or pattern of 
crimes in a vacuum. Connecting an offender to a crime is that noun to verb 
transformation of knowledge that Dervin refers to as the activity embedded in time and 
space. 
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3. Seeing in Pairs 
In the Strategy Safari, on the chapter “Strategy Formation as a Visionary Process” 
begins with a quote from Aristotle, “The soul…never thinks without a picture.”41  Just 
like Howard Gardner’s Five Minds of the Future, “seeing” by Mintzberg describes three 
pairs of factors sewn together by a seventh.42  These seven items of “seeing” can be 
associated with the situational awareness process for effective crime fighting: 
a. Ahead and Behind 
“Seeing ahead” is correlated to “seeing behind.”  Many agencies are trying 
to create the right recipe for the community to allow predictive policing to occur. 
Unfortunately, predictive policing, as mentioned earlier, could create a crime reduction 
performance expectation perceived by the community and, in some cases, the agency as 
having the forecasting ability to know exactly when and where the next crime is going to 
take place. While many describe predictive policing as taking disparate, but relevant, data 
and using the results to anticipate, prevent, and respond more effectively to future crime, 
maybe the term itself is where the problem lies.43  Predictive policing lends itself to an 
ideal of expectations, whereas if the term was explicative policing, it would take on a 
more humble process of unfolding and making clear the meaning of disparate data.   
Meteorologists use historical data (seeing behind) to try to forecast (seeing 
ahead) the weather for tomorrow. Despite this scientific approach, they cannot predict 
which street addresses will see rain and at what particular time, nor can they predict how 
many inches of precipitation—particularly not to the point that one could skip watering 
one’s plants on strictly their information. Most of us are accustomed to this report and 
take the broadcast in context to the daily results.   
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Using the term predictive policing automatically puts the process in the 
realm of the defensive by giving the potentially shallow hope. Unfortunately, despite the 
data pointers, police are not going to be at the exact address to thwart the burglar. One 
thing can be done in this vein. If a burglar is arrested by reacting from seeing the 
immediate behind faster, which translates to faster crime pattern discernment, then the 
agency and the community can see ahead that whatever addresses the perpetrator 
intended to hit next. The next crime is prevented because the perpetrator is already 
apprehended. Speed (of apprehension of the perpetrator) prevents the next crime. 
b. Above and Below 
Zooming out, or “seeing the big picture” is important in strategic thinking, 
but it has to be supported by “seeing below,” as described by Mintzberg.44  Seeing solely 
from above is equated to those who take cold data and make strategies in the comfort of 
their offices. Yet, without the ability to change one’s aperture to one of being primarily in 
the weeds, one’s point of reference can be distorted. The ability to rapidly discern crime 
patterns, connect modus operandi, and process investigative information into a theory or 
reality of a solution can be in between those details at the scene of the crime and the 
geospatial context all processed in high speed. In today’s crime fight, a pattern should not 
take five or 10 crimes to make a correlation. As a matter of fact, anything beyond two or 
three and an agency should be challenging their current processes. Technology can help 
to see this picture faster. 
Beyond simply zooming in or out—seeing crime density via geospatial-
temporal analysis—can help with place-based policing, otherwise known as hotspots. 
Since crime does not occur evenly across various landscapes and certain crimes have 
time-of-day tendencies, converting crime details into a thematic map using a choropleth 
method can help show crime saturation for a period by geography and time.45  Each 
crime that would define the various levels of lightness or darkness has its own story. By 
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examining each case in detail, a strategy can be proposed to deal with the general or 
specific crime pattern. 
Another example of seeing the big picture and focusing on seeing below—
and not just at ground level but actually seeing the underbelly—can provide the drill-
down process to change the entire scenery. Hypothetically, a police district can create a 
spatial-temporal reasoning process that highlights, at a high altitude, which two-thirds of 
major crimes are occurring in 10 percent of the community. Upon analyzing the cases, it 
can be hypothetically discerned that 60 percent of that crime is residential burglary, and 
the majority of the offenders caught or suspected are juvenile offenders. By dissecting the 
underbelly, an agency can learn that the reason these juvenile offenders are committing 
daytime, residential burglaries is related to a tremendous truancy and suspension rate. 
Continuing to explore, it is discovered that the truancy and suspensions are due to minor 
school violations and a zero tolerance for petty crimes. Upon bringing the community 
together, the police-school neighborhood creates a process to give a juvenile, first time 
offender a civil citation and community or school service hours. The swift and certain 
punishment allows for immediate sanctions but does not suspend or demoralize the 
student. The correction curve eventually shows that residential burglaries go down 
tremendously, and it all commenced from looking above and following instincts to drill 
down below. 
c. Vertical and Lateral 
Unlike solving problems in a step-by-step approach (known as vertical 
thinking) or trying to daydream a problem away by seeing the big picture and fantasizing 
about solutions but never putting them into action, lateral thinking (or seeing beside) uses 
a creative approach and reasoning that is not immediately obvious.46  The term of lateral 
thinking was credited to polymath, Edward de Bono of Malta.47  De Bono emphasized 
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the importance of lateral thinking, the capacity of shift frameworks, wearing of different 
hats, and coming up with a myriad of solutions to a perplexing dilemma. 
A crime example of lateral thinking, or thinking beside, can be examined 
in the unfortunate reality of juvenile crime. Quite often, juveniles committing crime are 
released to parents or guardians unless they have a significant history. This does not work 
too well for the community as the juvenile most often does not see any immediate 
sanctions for breaking into a car, somebody’s home, or even stealing from the local 
department store. This gives many juveniles the motivation to continue committing crime 
and also can elevate the local crime rate in an exponential manner. Juveniles committing 
crimes with impunity can wreak havoc in a neighborhood in a very short time when 
unabated by the criminal justice system, the parents, and ultimately the entire community. 
This lack of immediate offender control increases community crime rates. 
A creative solution around the bureaucracy of battling juvenile crime 
inside the system was discovered in Tampa (Florida) midway through a nine year, crime 
reduction period. When it became obvious that juvenile crime was attributing to many of 
the UCR Part One crimes,48 especially burglary, auto-burglary, robbery, and auto theft 
that and the bulk of the arrested delinquents were not scoring out to secure detention, 
lateral thinking kicked in. Realizing that these juveniles were placed on home detention 
by the judge in lieu of secure detention pending court and the ratio of home checks by 
juvenile probation officers was not effective, the patrol officers took matters into their 
own hands. A juvenile analyst began to itemize juveniles that were on home detention or 
probation that allowed home checks to occur. The patrol officers were given the list by 
patrol zone and introduced themselves to parent, parents, or guardians. After offering 
community-assistance opportunities to avoid a life of crime, the patrol officers would 
make these checks several times per day and make violation arrests as necessary. Juvenile 
crime plummeted and became the backbone of phase two of Tampa’s crime reduction 
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success. The less crime fighting, the more time for proactive policing, which leads to 
more time for prevention—not only of crime but terrorism as well. 
Psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi credits creativity (or lateral 
thinking) to an environment consisting of three autonomous elements: the individual, the 
cultural domain, and the social field (or those people and institutions that provide access 
to educational experiences and opportunities to perform).49  This is very important in the 
aforementioned example, as seeing beside is only of value when seeing beyond is placed 
into context.50  Having a creative process to combat juvenile crime, to lower overall 
crime, and allow proactive policing to increase seems to parlay well into 
Csikszentmihalyi’s formula. Much like it was not until Einstein’s innovative papers were 
given their due merit (versus simply being dubbed as atypical) and subsequently 
embraced by other physicists and mathematicians in the early 1900s; that they brought 
everyone’s independent work on light, gravity, time, and space into context.51  Local 
crime and terrorism, especially those precursor crimes combated in concurrence in the 
daily crime net, can be in the category of seeing beyond to keep the United States safer in 
the future. 
d. Seeing Through 
To summarize strategic thinking, after pairing seeing ahead and behind, 
seeing above and below, and seeing beside and beyond—it has to be seen through.52  
Dervin speaks of retreating to the safety of certainty, reconverting 
information/knowledge back to a noun from a verb.   An example offers story about a 
driver trying to change lanes and identifies a vehicle in his blind-spot, then instinctively 
retreats to the lane they previous occupied knowing it was formerly safe to be there. 
Seeing through; lands somewhere in the continuum between paralysis-by-analysis and 
extinct-by-instinct. Dervin cites a 1998 article on the “11 Deadliest Sins on Knowledge 
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Management” by Fahey and Prusak, and the one that seems to meld with seeing it 
through as it relates to strategic thinking is number eight, which reads, “Focusing on the 
past and the present, and not the future.”53 
In combating crime as a head-on approach to preventing terrorism, sense-
making, as it marries to the strategic thinking approach, can potentially be placed inside a 
technological platform in order to solicit information/knowledge into being a verb versus 
noun experience. Similar to Einstein’s work, which melded together mathematicians and 
physicists, so can Dervin, Gardner, Mintzberg and others to correlate knowledge 
management and strategic thinking into conquering crime and terrorism. 
E. CASE STUDY: BETA SAFECOP PILOT DEPLOYMENT 
As a way to bridge the information and intelligence gap for five operational days 
in the conventional crime fighting arena during the 2012 Republican National 
Convention, a new technology with RNC funding dollars was agile-developed. The 
solution, named Situational Awareness for Enforcers’ Common Operating Picture 
(SAFECOP), consists of four tech-cornerstones and a fifth dimension of real-time, front-
line fusion. This was to close the gap normally supplied by one-third of the personnel that 
did investigative and urgent follow-ups as well as a loss of 50 percent of the crime 
analysts. These assests were re-assigned during the 2012 RNC. 
The results of SAFECOP over five days concluded with a total crime reduction of 
26 percent. A specific SAFECOP result where a crime alert bulletin was made in real-
time from a surveillance video in a commercial burglary, led to finding a suspect roaming 
the streets within two hours with the stolen property in his possession. 
F. CRIME AND TERRORISM NEXUS 
The broken windows theory associates disorder with crime density.54  Precursory 
crimes, associated with acts of terrorism, have made similar associations especially since 
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September 11, 2001. The pairings (disorder-crime and crime-terrorism) have two 
additional associations within each. First, people and groups of people commit disorder, 
crime and terrorism; therefore, they can be caught. This evidence is empirical. As 
conveyed by Catholic priest and Ivy League psychologist Fr. Benedict Groeschel, Albert 
Einstein said there are two types of people—”Those that believe everything is a mystery  
and those that believe nothing is”55 —it is people that plan, that come, which act, and 
that flee.  “Who” they might be can be a mystery, but the fact that “they” can be 
discerned and captured is not. 
Second, and substantiated with research findings; shows that disorder, crime, and 
even precursory criminal acts involving terrorists has a local nexus. While information 
and globalization have made crime more mobile and transnational, local law enforcement 
has proven that it continues to see the same offenders, over and over, committing 
property crimes and varying types of fraud, as well as crimes against persons. Many 
agencies are trying to construct technological support around the long-time theory that 80 
percent of the crime is committed by 20 percent of the criminals. 
If the link between disorder and crime can be made (broken windows theory) and 
links can now be fused to show the relationship of precursory crimes relating to 
terrorism, then it makes sense to fight them in holistic order at the local agency level. If 
each local jurisdiction embraces similar tenets of situational awareness provided by 
proven, in-production technologies, then law enforcement can accelerate their tasks of 
combating disorder-crime and crime-terrorism. 
In a 2007 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report for congress, titled 
Terrorist Precursor Crimes: Issues and Options for Congress, 11 terrorist precursor 
crime categories are listed:56“Business and Charity Fronts, Counterfeiting Money, 
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Counterfeit Goods, Narcotics, Smuggling and Import/Export Violations, Robbery and 
Theft, Fraud, Phone Scams and Cell Phone Activity, Bribery, Immigration and Identity 
Crimes, and Incitement.” 
While most of the underpinnings of each crime category listed are illicit financial 
gain, local law enforcement officials, with a strong crime fighting strategy, have the best 
opportunity to thwart, disrupt, or at least identify activities. In the same CRS report, it 
discusses that, irrespective of an ideology or strategic goal, all terrorist groups have 
several basic needs in common, including funding, security, operative support, 
propaganda, and appearance of force.57  Activities are necessary to accommodate these 
needs, and precursor crimes can be defined as unlawful acts undertaken to facilitate a 
terrorist attack or to support a terrorist campaign.58 
As early as 2004, it was documented that patrol officers are more likely than any 
other law enforcement to have contact with residents of a community or patrol area who 
are also members of terrorist groups. Cited as a truism, based on a traffic stop or service 
call, police should be trained and well versed at recognizing indicators that reveal 
anything from a suspect’s economic system or other activity used in the furtherance of 
their strategy.59 
Alexander and Mors documented in their article that: 
More than five years since 9/11, it is critical to articulate new themes and 
best practices that will aid state and local law enforcement in combating 
terrorism. This article discusses how patrol officers can assist in 
identifying and capturing domestic and international terrorists while 
undertaking traditional duties, with particular emphasis on traffic stops 
and calls for service. In doing so, the study will also suggest a number of 
strategies and methodologies that they may employ in their communities. 
Furthermore, it will cover examples of patrol officer interactions with 
actual terrorists and benign actors while elucidating the means to 
distinguish between the two. Also, the article provides some context to the 
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topic of terrorism, current terror trends, and other issues relating to 
terrorist operations (e.g., funding, recruitment, modus operandi) so that 
law enforcement has a better appreciation of the challenges facing them.60 
Local law enforcement officers make hundreds of thousands of contacts each year 
through calls for service, suspicious activity, traffic stops, and arrests. Using an example 
from Tampa, Florida as a reference, a 2010 traffic stop led to the discovery of major U.S. 
tax-fraud scheme and the potential for our tax-dollars being laundered on a transnational 
level and possibly linked to international terrorism funding. In the same jurisdiction, a 
victim felt so comfortable with his law enforcement relationship that he reported his own 
individual robbery of his tax-fraud spoils, which amounted to a portion of his three 
million dollar receivables on his nine million dollar filings. 
Exploratory research by Smith, Damphouse, and Roberts, focused on the 
identification of general temporal, and spatial patterns of activity.61  On average, the 
terrorist groups studied had been in existence for some 1,205 days from the date of the 
first known planning meeting to the date of the actual/planned terrorist incident. 
However, on average, a lull in activities occurred during the last three to four weeks prior 
to the incident. Approximately two and one-half known planning and preparatory 
behaviors were recorded per incident and these varied by type of terrorist group. The 
spatial analysis revealed that terrorists typically live relatively close to the incident 
target.62 Nearly one-half of the terrorists resided within 30 miles of the target location. 
Similarly, approximately one-half of the terrorists engaged in their planning and 
preparatory activities within this distance of their residences. Finally, a similar percentage 
of preparatory behaviors took place within 30 miles of the eventual target of the terrorist 
incident.63 
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While the researchers were hesitant to identify this data with the life span of a 
terrorist group, their point was that they were very active (over three years), and more 
importantly to the local crime fighting nexus, they operated within a relatively small 
geographical space. 
G. CONCLUSION 
In 2009, Sullivan and Wirtz published an article titled, “Global Metropolitan 
Policing: An Emerging Trend in Intelligence Sharing.”  In their conclusion, it was 
affirmed that situational awareness across local jurisdictions was the responsibility of law 
enforcement and was the basis of global metropolitan policing.64 
In the proposed V2I2SION and SAFECOP project, technology is analogous to a 
wrapper on an already existing set of processes that, while disparately performed, help to 
create the needed consistency within a common operating picture to bring forth added 
efficiency in crime reduction and terrorism prevention. Essentially, V2I2SION and 
SAFECOP are the proposed solution to bring a tactical situational awareness platform in 
the form of a local or regional common operating picture and become that responsibility 
component previously mentioned. 
In this case, V2I2SION and SAFECOP can answer the why portion of the 
technology question before the technological project begins and then moving slowly into 
the how portion. If the why piece had not been satisfied, then whether a matter of 
technological ethics or examining human communication and coordination toward 
problem solving, the project could commence in the how state, and quite possibly become 
orphaned from the “resistant-to-change” personnel that is inside the law enforcement 
culture. 
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III. METHOD  
A. OVERVIEW 
Since the problem statement and associated hypothesis suggests that the use of 
technology, specifically the consistent sharing of actionable information and intelligence 
and case management can reduce crime more effectively and efficiently—both a 
qualitative and quantitative analysis will be conducted. 
B. BURGLARY 
First, a particular crime (burglary) will be qualitatively examined inside a single, 
medium-large agency, the Tampa Police Department, looking for gaps in the 
investigation process. Burglaries or other crimes involving offenders with burglary 
histories, strewn through the agency’s three patrol districts will analyzed as separate 
cases. A comparison will be conducted of those solved with expediency through best 
processes versus those that went either unsolved or had a delay in solving due to less than 
exemplary practices. Cross-crime-offenders will also be identified within these cases to 
demonstrate the root behavior as a nexus to other crimes as well as those crimes 
identified as precursor activities to acts of terrorism. 
The same crime will then be analyzed quantitatively over a three-year period 
among 26 other agencies, including the Tampa Police Department, within the United 
States that either are, or were, Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) jurisdictions.65  By 
being a UASI jurisdiction, an agency would be an ideal comparative as a locality by 
showing terrorism risk based on receiving funding toward mitigation of that assessed 
threat, vulnerability, and consequence—known as risk. 
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C. QUALITATIVE SCOPE 
The purpose of the qualitative analysis is to examine if some burglary offenses 
(representative of all crimes, including those identified as precursory crimes of terrorism 
activity) receive a better and timelier investigative experience than other burglaries—then 
all crimes can be reduced. The crime of burglary is being used since it is a property 
crime, versus a crime of violence. Many agencies tend to report these crimes similar to an 
insurance claim versus trying to actually solve them. Crimes such as homicide, even with 
a completely unknown suspect and modus operandi (MO/style), will get a myriad of 
investigators, analysts, and crime scene technicians at the scene, as well as relentless 
follow-up back at the station. Since resources limit the ability to investigate routine 
burglaries with the intensity of a homicide, if the case study reveals that burglaries can be 
elevated to homicide-grade urgency and follow-up, through a supporting technological 
platform and potentially closed by arrest, then that crime can be theoretically reduced.   
The reduction of one type of property crime, burglary, can lead to a similar 
process for all crimes, and, therefore, reduce crime in a locality. That reduction, through 
de-randomization of effort inside a common operating environment can translate to more 
proactive policing and allow an inversion of the concern that due to the domestic efforts 
on anti- and counterterrorism, local crime may increase because of the added 
responsibility due to the demand on the same or less resources.66  Less crime, argues 
more time to proactively enforce and deter, detect, and disrupt terrorism. 
The Tampa Police Department has three patrol districts to serve the community. 
Each patrol district is commanded by one major, subdivided into two patrol sectors, and 
commanded by captains who directly report to their respective majors. While the agency 
has standard operating procedures (SOPs), as well as a department mission, and strategic 
focus, each district is designed to operate with similar, decentralized resources in order to 
customize their tactical solutions. This design is important to the research methodology in 
that since each district houses exactly the same resource functionalities and operates to an 
                                                 




agency mission and strategic focus, their tactical style of communicating information, 
intelligence, as well as apply urgency and consistency within case management can be 
affected by subjective factors such as leadership style and sub-deployment schemes. 
By example, because the department lacks a technological-based work template to 
operate within a common operating picture and provide full-time situational awareness 
across the agency’s work shifts, work cycles, and geographic boundaries various pieces 
of the investigation puzzle can fall into these communication gaps to the demise of the 
unknowing victim and to the aid of the benefitting criminal. If one district uses a property 
crimes’ detective to be available and bridge the investigative gap on an adverse shift 
(evenings versus days), seven days per week, that district may have more opportunities to 
keep investigative momentum than a district that does not operate in a similar way. 
By using one particular agency (i.e., TPD) and a specific property crime/offender 
(burglary), the ability to examine multiple case studies under the various patrol districts; 
allowed consistency with the same mission and strategic focus. The variable, however, is 
how each reports, investigates, communicates and follow-ups with different urgency and 
intensity. This will set the stage for the use of a technological support tool to help 
standardize and de-randomize the approach. This will potentially allow an opportunity for 
a solution to be developed that will template a process for all best practices used by the 
agency. As it is, the agency uses practices and processes in varying degrees and 
inconsistently. 
Since there are six patrol sectors commanded by three different majors and six 
different captains, reports will be pulled from each to serve as a control sample.  (See 
appendix for the report copies). These control sample cases will have the victims’ identity 
redacted for privacy reason, including the name and address of the incident; or be cleared 
through public records’ release review. Residential burglaries, commercial burglaries, 
and other cases with offender burglary histories will be used for the case study. These 
control sample cases will be considered cases with gaps in investigative leads, or dead-




enforcement, as well as the agency’s best practices have either been exhausted, or they 
have been inconsistently applied at the victims’ expense or the suspects’ benefit. 
While each unsolved case is considered inactive, or potentially unable to be 
solved without some unique piece of evidence or admission surfacing in the future, each 
case will be examined independently. The each case will be analyzed collectively for 
individual data nodes that could potentially exist on a theoretical, technological solution 
to help keep the case “alive.”  An inactive case, which sits archived in a records 
management system and potentially forgotten, will not remain readily accessible. 
Therefore, it will not be a part of the common operating picture and situational 
awareness, which allows the criminals to prosper in additional opportunities. 
A set of residential and commercial burglaries, as well as cases with offenders 
having a burglary history will also be extracted from the record’s section to be sample 
data. All cases of these cases will have been solved with an arrest. Gap analyses will be 
made within the samples of the data nodes for potential use of a common operating, 
supporting technological work template to potentially increase speed and solvability of 
cases. In essence, the sample will be reverse engineered (reverse investigated) to see 
which case management process was missing in the inactive cases that would allow it to 
become solved. 
Florida State Statute 810.02 explains the probable cause for burglary as: 
810.02 Burglary. 
(1)(a) For offenses committed on or before July 1, 2001, “burglary” means 
entering or remaining in a dwelling, a structure, or a conveyance with the 
intent to commit an offense therein, unless the premises are at the time 
open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to enter or 
remain. 
(b) For offenses committed after July 1, 2001, “burglary” means:  
1. Entering a dwelling, a structure, or a conveyance with the intent to 
commit an offense therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the 




2. Notwithstanding a licensed or invited entry, remaining in a dwelling, 
structure, or conveyance:  
a. Surreptitiously, with the intent to commit an offense therein; 
b. After permission to remain therein has been withdrawn, with the intent 
to commit an offense therein; or 
c. To commit or attempt to commit a forcible felony, as defined in s. 
776.08.67 
D. QUANTITATIVE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
Beyond examining the case studies within a single agency, analysis the same 
crime (burglary) will be used to compare the 26 agency’s (including Tampa’s) arrest 
responsiveness to this offense over a three-year period: 2008–2010. The Federal Bureau 
of Investigation’s (FBI) Uniform Crime Report (UCR) standardizes the national elements 
for burglary as: 
The FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program defines burglary as 
the unlawful entry of a structure to commit a felony or theft. To classify an 
offense as a burglary, the use of force to gain entry need not have 
occurred. The UCR Program has three sub classifications for burglary: 
forcible entry, unlawful entry where no force is used, and attempted 
forcible entry. The UCR definition of “structure” includes apartment, barn, 
house trailer or houseboat when used as a permanent dwelling, office, 
railroad car (not automobile), stable, and vessel (i.e., ship).68 
Responsiveness will be defined as a ratio of the number of burglaries within the 
three-year period, by year; as compared to the number of arrests for burglary within the 
same year. This will then be correlated to the cities’ crime rate status. It is important to 
note that this is not case-clearing statistics, but a ratio of those burglaries that were 
committed within the calendar year and the arrests within the same calendar year—
regardless of the case connection. However, this will not capture warrants for burglary 
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within or outside the measured jurisdiction, but only those arrests that have been made 
either in-progress or latently without a warrant being issued. The relevance here is 
denoted in speed of arrests which serve as a counter-measure to being people being 
victimized by more burglars—get away today; commit more tomorrow. While a monthly 
ratio would be preferred to an annual ratio to demonstrate speed, the data for that 
granularity would have been cumbersome. Thus, a three-year examination was preferred 
as a measure of consistency. 
The purpose for the using the UASI jurisdictions, whether tier one or tier two 
cities, is to add the root nexus of being geo-assessed for terrorism risk. Since one of the 
main features of this research is to potentially thwart terrorism as a byproduct of fighting 
crime well, mapping UASI jurisdictions’ ability to be responsive to the crime of burglary 
should reveal the details of their particular strategy results to what is deemed a property 
crime. Fight burglary well; fight all crime well. Fight all crime well; potentially fight 
terrorism well. 
The following meta-data will be captured minimally for each of the 25 UASI law 
enforcement agencies, inclusive of the responsiveness-to-burglary-data to show 
proportionality to Tampa:  Agency name; national city ranking; national crime ranking; 
sworn personnel authorized strength compared to citizens; UCR burglary count for 2008, 
2009, and 2010; burglary arrest counts for 2008, 2009, and 2010; and analytical strategy 
or strategies (e.g., Intel-led, Predictive Analysis, SMART policing, and CompStat). 
E. ANTICIPATED OUTCOME 
The qualitative analysis is anticipated to reveal that those cases that yielded an 
expedient arrest followed a particular process cycle in contrast to those cases that became 
inactive or had delays in solving but that had actionable opportunities or a gap in the 
investigative processing. If this hypothesis is demonstrated in the analysis, then it will 





It is also expected that the quantitative analysis will reveal that those agencies in 
the UASI jurisdictions with a higher risk assessment for terrorism will show a lesser 
achievement than the home agency (Tampa). It is expected that the home agency will 
have two opportunities for improvement with the use of a field-based technology. The 
first will be to potentially solve crime faster. The second would be to better detect, deter, 









IV. QUALITATIVE RESEARCH  
A. INTRODUCTION 
As mentioned earlier, using burglary as an representative sample, including those 
examined as precursor crimes of terrorism, makes an interesting choice. Like a struggling 
marriage, the tenacity to solve a burglary with no leads comes down to an individual or 
collective choice. One can both choose to stay married and endure the fire together and 
feel the joy in the future or quit and move on to the next chapter of life and leave the 
victims and statistics behind. Little compares to the joy of solving who-done-it burglaries.   
In the Jim Collin’s book, Good to Great, there is a story about David Scott, a 
world-class triathlete who wanted to progress beyond his current ability. Despite an 
already strict diet regiment, he decided to rinse his cottage cheese in order to make his 
training diet have even less fat, versus accepting its normal processing.69  Some use as an 
analogy that represents the extra 10 percent in performance, rather than settling for the 
normal 75 to 90 percent. 
Using a single agency for the research in most cases would not be ideal. However, 
when an agency such as the Tampa Police Department is down over 64 percent in overall 
part one crimes since 2002, and specifically down in burglary over 56 percent (6,283 in 
2002 versus 2,718 in 2011), it is reasonable to examine the processes against themselves. 
This is much like a track athlete trying to avoid a plateau by progressing his or her score. 
In 2008, one of the three patrol districts in Tampa, Florida was struggling with the 
crime of burglary. There were no definitive patterns because patterns were overlaying 
other patterns, and none of the patterns were discernible until they were reverse 
engineered into post-arrest, case studies. One patrol sergeant, Jerry Clark, who had a 
distinct dislike of burglars said, “The burglars in this district are like hydras [referring to 
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the mythological, many-headed water serpents], you catch one (metaphorically cutting 
off its head), and two more (heads) grow back.” 
The first thing that had to be done to create a modern process was to dissect the 
current one. An analysis of the process revealed there were too many gaps, especially at 
the point of investigative origin. Although the scenes were investigated, the crime labs 
came out, and, of course, the proverbial neighborhood surveys were done, not necessarily 
to catch anyone, but to have a check-off for the process. The case then would be routed to 
a property detective, but only if there were leads identified at the scene. Otherwise, the 
investigation was about as useful as an insurance claim. 
Many agencies may not consider the crime of burglary a big ordeal. After all, the 
Tampa Police Department, at this point was down over 42 percent in Uniform Crime 
Report (UCR) Part One Offenses; which includes burglary. This translated to over 15,000 
less victims between the end of 2002 and the end of 2007.70  Not many agencies, if any 
reach this point, so why not look to simply sustain this effort, hold back the  repeated 
victims on each year, and convey to the community a collaborative job well done? In 
other words, be satisfied with that 75 to 90 percentile performance. Well, unbeknownst to 
the department and the community, the effort placed into solving burglary more 
effectively identified a much more honed process for all crimes, and between 2007 and 
2011, netted another 8,000 less victims.71 
There was no specially developed process in the “year-of-the-burglar” during 
2008, and nothing magical happened either. The investigative components were always 
there, they just were not done quickly enough or sustained well enough. The process 
needed to be done more quickly, and with more intensity than ever before. Once the 
investigative processes and sharing of information and intelligence were sped up, 
momentum started identifying perpetrators within the system of systems and the  
 
department was able to get ahead of the hydra-headed burglar to the point that is was 
                                                 





actually people (known offenders) committing the crimes—not some mysterious and 
mythological creature. 
Relentless follow-ups were the key, and leads were developed whereas in the past 
cases were just accepted as “no leads.”  Not only were the micro-processes sped up, but 
an environment was created in which to share weekly information and intelligence. These 
conditions consistently revealed the following: 
• Gaps in processes that were now put into a group-think environment 
• Sharing of modus operandi (MO) and being connected to offenders based 
on collective experience 
• Generating offender knowledge of cross-crime offenders, giving 
validation that many offenders commit multiple offenses and stay within a 
certain geography 
By example, here are several cases that revealed the improved process, the 
remaining weak processes, and the cross-offenders. If these can exist between burglary 
and other crimes, they can exist in precursor crimes related to terrorism planning and 
execution. 
B. GOOD PROCESSES, WEAK PROCESSES AND CROSS-OFFENDERS 
 CASE ANALYSES 
The following is a analysis of case studies with indicate good processes, weak 











Table 1.   Case Number: 2009–354041 
Agency: Tampa Police Department Case Number: 2009–354041 
Case summary: 
On June 19, 2009, a burglary was reported to the commercial business, “Paintballers” at 
2142 W. Hillsborough Ave. in Tampa, FL. Surveillance video revealed the presence of 
two white males, one with a tattoo, driving a white older model Ford Aerostar van. The 
van had the faded words “Coca Cola” on the side of the van. The males used a 
sledgehammer to break the front glass of the business and steal several items. The latent 
investigator responded to the Coca Cola Corporation at Fowler/59th St. regarding the 
leads on the van. The manager sent the detectives to the Greater Tampa Bay Auto 
Auction, where the vehicles no longer used are sent for wholesale purchasing. There the 
detectives received a list of VIN numbers on Ford Aerostars that were sold in the past 
12 months. The list was cross referenced with known offenders and close proximity to 
Paintballers. Surveillance was set up on one residence and the suspect vehicle appeared. 
Continued investigation identified the suspect. All of this was done within 24 hours of 
the offense occurring. The defendants were charged accordingly. 
Process Gap Analysis:   
This is an example of speed and relentless follow-up. While no gaps appear to be 
present in this case example, scenario planning asks, “what if” as it relates to the 
positive leads becoming cold as opposed to hot and viable. The steps to be taken, if 
momentum was lost, would be apply a situational awareness case management solution 
so the next follow-up team could avoid redundancy. The defendants and their modus 














Table 2.   Case Number: 2009–378142 
Agency: Tampa Police Department Case Number: 2009–378142 
Case summary: 
On June 27, 2009, an armed robbery of the Circle K at 1451 Fowler occurred. The 
suspects were two black males, one of which was captured briefly on video prior to 
putting on his mask. The video was collected immediately after the offense occurred 
and sent to Crimestoppers for media coverage. On July 10, 2009, a Crimestoppers tip 
came in stating that the robber was named “Joe,” and that he had been recently arrested. 
Some other information, including possible associates, was gathered. Latent 
investigators immediately began researching all black males that had been arrested in 
the previous few weeks with the name “Joe.”  After reviewing numerous photographs, a 
possible suspect was identified as a physical match. Additional investigation positively 
identified that subject had committed the crime. The defendant, Joey Coleman, with a 
date-of-birth (DOB) of 9/24/90, was charged with this offense. He has an extensive 
history to include burglary offenses. 
Process Gap Analysis: 
The rapid processing of the on scene video, sharing to the local community, quick 
action on the anonymous tip, and history of cross-offenses, including burglary, shows a 
solid investigative approach. This apprehended robber is also a cross-offender who 
could potentially be captured in the offender data for future offenses, should he be 
released. Other, open robbery and burglary cases can be reviewed against this defendant 
by using his arrest overlay by geography and his modus operandi for potential case 






Table 3.   Case Number: 2012–136408 
Agency: Tampa Police Department Case Number: 2012–136408 
Case Summary: 
On March 8, 2012, an intrusion alarm and a subsequent residential burglary were 
discovered at 2901 Kelly Ridge Lane. The responding officer immediately noted that he 
had responded to 2903 Kelly Ridge Lane several times in the past for a juvenile who 
was delinquent in various ways, including domestic issues and truancy (offender 
awareness). It was determined that this same juvenile, Reginald Harper, DOB 5/31/98, 
was in fact at home and suspended from school. A witness identified Harper as having 
been in the victim’s yard around the time of the offense. When questioned, Harper 
admitted to breaking into the victim’s home, and the money stolen from her bedroom 
was recovered. Since this arrest, Harper has been involved in several other burglary 
related crimes in the area.   
Process Gap Analysis: 
Having offender awareness momentum from several years of relentless follow-ups to all 
crimes allowed the previous effort of offender awareness to be recognized by the 
originating officer. By applying a real-time, situational awareness tool offender can be 
part of the future algorithms required to solve potentially new cases similar in nature. 
There is no reason to rely on happenstance, when a real-time, distributed technological 







Table 4.   Case Number: 2011–700861 
Agency: Tampa Police Department Case Number: 2011–700861 
Case Summary: 
On December 21, 2011, a residential burglary was reported at 1733 E. Mulberry Drive. 
The victim reported that some time overnight an unknown person entered her home and 
stole her ATM card, among other small items. The responding patrol officer, with the 
assistance of her zone Rapid Offender Control (ROC) officer, had the victim call her 
bank to determine if the card had been used. The card had in fact been used at a local 7–
11. The video was collected and shown to the victim who immediately identified the 
subject as her niece’s boyfriend, Chad. Chad Bernhardt, DOB 12/19/80, was located in 
Hillsborough County later that afternoon and charged accordingly.   
Process Gap Analysis: 
In 2010, street level narcotics officers, and street anti-crime officers were merged 
together for a more holistic crime focus. This become a deployed layer between the 
patrol officer and the area detective. Detectives were de-specialized and given areas of 
responsibilities as the offenders became more cross-offending by area rather than by 
specialty of crime. This deployment was born out of the need to keep up with the new 
processes started in 2008. Previously, this case may have been referred to a latent 
investigator and there would have been slim possibility of running down a video the 
same day the offense occurred and making an arrest. 
This particular case had a positive ending. To repeat this success, a technological 
solution that provides case management progress would be ideal, maintaining 






Table 5.   Case Number: 2011–629469 
Agency: Tampa Police Department Case Number: 2011–629469 
Case Summary: 
On November 11, 2011, a commercial burglary was reported to the business located at 
7901 N. Nebraska Ave., a storefront rented temporarily by the Florida Department of 
Transportation (FDOT), who was doing roadwork in the area. Two small refrigerators 
were stolen. Very clear fingerprints were visible on the glass at the point of entry. The 
supervisor on scene called a fingerprint specialist in on overtime to analyze the prints 
(the offense was reported on the weekend). The prints were run through the Automated 
Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS). Identification was made and the suspect, 
Jason Prudhomme, DOB 6/19/70, was in custody and charged with the burglary within 
12 hours of the reporting of the crime. 
Process Gap Analysis: 
Supervisory grade accountability in the field and intense forensic follow-up, including 
calling in a latent fingerprint investigator, kept additional burglaries from occurring. 
Speed and good decisions are apparent in this case. To allow the continuation of this 
model in all cases, case management progress should be placed into one common 
operating picture. This will allow not only good case management and investigative 






Table 6.   Case Number: 2011–618292 
Agency: Tampa Police Department Case Number: 2011–618292 
Case Summary: 
On November 5, 2011, a shooting occurred at Salem’s Gyro, 1611 N. Nebraska Ave. 
The victim died of his wounds shortly afterwards. An officer was on scene and viewed 
the surveillance video of the incident. The suspect was wearing distinct camouflage 
clothing and had a thick beard. He recalled arresting a subject matching that description 
in January, 2011 named Jordan Hill, DOB 3/6/88. The video was shown to associates 
of Hill who identified him as the shooter. Hill confessed to his involvement in the 
murder and was charged accordingly. Hill has an extensive criminal history, including 
burglary.  
Process Gap Analysis: 
Because the officer had good knowledge of area, to the level of recollecting what they 
were wearing during the previous arrests, a person who had a burglary past was rapidly 
arrested for murder. 
This case relied on a key recollection of a known offender by one officer. If this 
defendant had been previously placed into an available technological solution, then the 
data would have been available to all on-duty personnel for a potential correlation to 







Table 7.   Case Number: 2012–92953 
Agency: Tampa Police Department Case Number: 2012–92953 
Case Summary: 
On Feb 16, 2012, a home located at 1418 E. 98th Ave was burglarized. On Feb 24, 
2012, an Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) identified a fingerprint as 
matching those of Andre Clemons, DOB 9/5/95, a notorious burglar in Sector C of 
District Two. The print was lifted off a piece of property stolen in the burglary (a 
Monster cable box) and dropped by the suspect as he fled into the next yard. Andre 
Clemons was arrested by a ROC on March 17, 2012. He confessed to possessing the 
stolen property from the burglary and was charged accordingly. 
Process Gap Analysis: 
The print was examined and acted upon too slowly. Allowing eight days to lapse 
between the crime and the identification, and then several more weeks before an arrest 
can allow many more crimes to occur. This could be avoided by having better case 
management process and having a technological awareness system in place with an 







Table 8.   Case Number: 2011–514727 
Agency: Tampa Police Department Case Number: 2011–514727 
Case Summary: 
On September 12, 2011, a burglary was reported at 6601 N. 30th Street. On December 
27, an Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) match was made from a 
print on a windowsill (the point of entry) to Nathan Tomlinson, DOB 1/17/81. 
Tomlinson was located and arrested on 1/18/12. He denied involvement in the burglary 
and the case was direct filed to the State Attorney’s Office (SAO). 
Process Gap Analysis: 
Over three and on-half months passed before the identification of the print was made. 
Regardless of the prosecution in this case, the suspect may have committed a 
tremendous amount of burglaries and other potential offenses in the time lapse. Having 
better case management and situational awareness updates could have eliminated this 
challenge. 
Even with the delay, if the data on the offender was placed, post arrest, into a geo-
spatial situational awareness solution then it is possible that his actions can be reverse-
investigated and possibly discovering through correlations his involvement in other area 
burglaries. This potential benefit is not only to the other victims, but can become a 
future benefit to new burglary victims by having a better chance for a longer sentence – 





Table 9.   Case Number: 2009–493545 
Agency: Tampa Police Department Case Number: 2009–493545 
Case Summary: 
On August 21, 2009, a burglary is reported at 214 W. Giddens Avenue. The report was 
not assigned to a latent investigator until August 28, 2009 in the afternoon. The 
detective assigned to the case is able to identify the suspect and the fact that some of the 
stolen property was pawned after the initial interview with the victim, which occurred 
the day the case was assigned. The suspect, Joseph Frye, DOB 4/13/60, committed an 
armed sexual battery on August 28, 2009 at 0245 at 5607 N. Seminole Ave. The victim 
was a 75 year old woman. The suspect had been released from the Florida state prison 
system on August 1, 2009. He had been imprisoned five times in his lifetime for 
various violent offenses including rape, burglary, and robbery. 
Process Gap Analysis: 
This burglary followed a typical routing of “no leads.” The new process caught the case 
in what was labeled a “notification” of any part one crime in a detective’s zone led to a 
follow-up, which is less than a formal case referral. Had the follow-up occurred 
immediately, it may have been possible to have avoided the horrific rape that occurred 
on the date the burglary was actually assigned for follow-up via the notification process. 
It also may have been possible to have avoided this horrific offense had the defendant 
been recognized as a cross-offender (burglary-rape) or had the officers and detectives 





Table 10.   Case Number: 2011–668468 
Agency: Tampa Police Department Case Number: 2011–668468 
Case Summary: 
Between the dates of November 21, 2011 and December 2, 2011, eight commercial 
armed robberies occurred throughout the city of Tampa committed by the same subjects. 
The pattern was dubbed the “Armenia Corridor” because of the geographical area that 
the subjects were frequenting when committing their crimes. The last robbery occurred 
on Friday, December 12, 2011 at El Zarape Restaurant, located at 4820 N. Armenia 
Ave., at 2245 hours. Going unnoticed by investigators until approximately 1600 hours 
the next day, a T-Mobile cellular phone was stolen from the victim in this offense. The 
phone was pinged and a vehicle seen in one of the previous offenses (Faedo Bakery) 
was located in the area of the cell phone, which was still on. The vehicle was followed, 
the suspects were arrested, and numerous pieces of evidence were recovered including 
weapons and masks. This brought an end to this violent crime spree.  
Process Gap Analysis: 
The lapse almost 24 hours before technologically investigating the stolen phone could 
have allowed the commercial robbery pattern to continue, possibly putting future 
victims at serious risk. By having these crimes accounted for inside a single, situational 
awareness technology, process gaps could potentially be recognized more quickly and 
solutions applied more effectively. This case turned out positively once the phone 
information was investigated. However, a case that wasn’t a part of a major pattern may 
have allowed this phone opportunity to go unnoticed and the phone may have lost 
service. Either way, it might not have been possible to follow up. 
Additionally, had this cross-offender (robbery-burglary) data been previously captured 
in a technological solution made and available in real-time to the pattern investigators, 






Table 11.   Case Number: 2008–347402 and 08–357777 
Agency: Tampa Police Department Case Number: 2008–347402 and 08–357777 
Case Summary: 
In June 2008, Walter Pinckney, DOB 2/26/90, and three other defendants went on a 
violent crime spree, committing a total of six armed home invasion robberies in the 
New Tampa (annexed territory in northeast Tampa) area. Once they made their way into 
the victims homes, they pistol whipped, threatened, and even beat one with a frying pan, 
before fleeing with various items from the victims homes. Investigation revealed that 
the escape vehicle was an orange Saturn Vue, registered to one of the defendant’s 
girlfriends. Under real-time surveillance, the vehicle was followed by the police to 4223 
River Hills Drive, where the defendants were observed kicking in the front door of the 
residence, flee with several items, and drive away. The defendants were apprehended a 
short distance away, still in possession of the stolen items from the burglary, including a 
gun stolen from the residence. Pinckney is serving a 10 year prison sentence. 
Process Gap Analysis: 
While at first review, this would appear to be a satisfactory ending, it could have 
potentially happened faster had there been more real-time situational awareness and 
case management, not only within the Tampa Police Department, but other areas. There 
were other cases discovered in the neighboring jurisdiction of the unincorporated area of 
Hillsborough County. There was a previous burglary connection to the defendants in 
2007. 
Had these data for these offenders, coupled with the evolving criminal pattern, been 
updated for both agencies in real-time, via a technological solution, the case could have 





Table 12.   Case Number: 2011–060120 and 11–381101 
Agency: Tampa Police Department Case Number: 2011–060120 and 11–381101 
Case Summary: 
Prior to July of 2011, Sharquay Knighton, DOB 4/3/95, had been arrested for 
residential burglary approximately a dozen times, including one a 4209 E. Curtis St in 
January 2011. In July 2011, he participated in a violent armed robbery of a female 
arriving home from work. As she attempted to walk to her apartment, she was 
confronted by several masked men, one of which threatened her with a rifle and 
demanded her purse. The victim’s credit card was used a short time later at an ATM 
machine. Surveillance video captured Sharquay Knighton using the victim’s card. 
Knighton was tried as an adult and is serving a seven year prison sentence. 
Process Gap Analysis: 
While this case was solved by having good offender knowledge and quick follow-up on 
the use of the victim’s credit card, the example shows that the offender evolved into 
committing violent offenses. 
By maintaining the case flow in a common operating picture, all functional investigators 
can have a timely understanding in the myriad of case-solving options for this particular 






Table 13.   Case Number: 2010–532474 
Agency: Tampa Police Department Case Number: 2010–532474 
Case Summary: 
Marterrance Holloway, DOB 8/15/79, has been arrested over 30 times for numerous 
crimes, including burglary and auto burglary. He has notoriously been known in the 
East Tampa area as a fence for stolen property. On September 7, 2010, District Three 
ROC officers received information that (wanted for violation of probation or VOP) 
Holloway, AKA “Quat,” was in room 251 of the Howard Johnson motel. Upon arrival, 
a complete tax fraud operation was underway in the hotel room. Computers, ledgers, 
printers, Turbo-Tax processed refund cards, and other miscellaneous items were in plain 
view. Quat and other defendants were arrested. The defendants were turned over to the 
Secret Service for indictment 
Process Gap Analysis: 
By having street-level situational awareness of offenders, as well as current crime 
trends, the officers were able to arrest as well as recognize a federal tax crime, which 
was then investigated.. These tax crimes have led to additional investigations of money 
laundering and potential funding of terrorism groups outside the U.S. 
There is an opportunity to house this case into a situational awareness solution, which 






Table 14.   Case Number: 2011–464806 
Agency: Tampa Police Department Case Number: 2011–464806 
Case Summary: 
Rashad Cortez, DOB 2/12/87, was pulled over for a traffic infraction and found to not 
have a valid driver license. He was in possession of three “Green Dot” Turbo-Tax 
processed, refund debit cards in three different names. He told the officers that the 
people who the cards were issued to were his relatives. Further investigation revealed 
that these people were victims of identity theft and their taxes were filed fraudulently. 
Cortez was captured on surveillance video at ATMs and businesses using the Green Dot 
cards. Cortez, who has a history of burglary and auto theft, was charged with identity 
theft.   
Process Gap Analysis: 
This case exemplifies cross-offender status, as well as the illegal procurement of the 
refund cards (typically used domestically and internationally) that are under subsequent 
investigations for not only crimes in the U.S., but also concerns of money being sent 
overseas for illicit purposes. 
This defines another opportunity to place the case management flow and offenders into 
a technological solution that would give more investigators real-time awareness for 






Table 15.   Case Number: 2011–900497 
Agency: Tampa Police Department Case Number: 2011–900497 
Case Summary: 
Jeff Borgelin, DOB 6/15/90, was pulled over for a traffic infraction and found to not 
have a valid driver license. He was in possession of numerous debit and credit cards that 
were not issued in his name. Investigation revealed that these persons were the victims 
of tax fraud and their income taxes were filed without their knowledge or permission. 
Borgelin was captured on surveillance video at several different business establishments 
and ATM machines using these fraudulently obtained cards. He was charged with 
identity theft and He has a burglary and auto burglary history. 
Process Gap Analysis: 
Is case demonstrates the cross-offender status, as well as the illegal procurement of the 
refund cards (typically used domestically and internationally) that are under subsequent 
investigations for not only crimes in the U.S., but also concerns of money being sent 
overseas for illicit purposes. 
This defines another opportunity to place the case management flow and offenders into 
a solution that make more investigators have real-time awareness for future, similar 
cases that have cross-offender status. 
C. SUMMARY/FINDINGS 
These 15 case studies, with several aspects in common, demonstrated the varying 
degrees of operational success. To extrapolate, the most common denominator, which the 
correlation to a current or previous burglary case, demonstrates the need for cross-
offender management at minimum within a situational awareness environment. 
If there had been a supporting technological solution, offering real-time 
situational awareness inside one common operating picture, many of these cases may 







intelligence sharing and vetting. The mere reliance of more offenses to solve the current 
and previous cases forces an agency to review its investigative and information sharing 
processes. 
If anyone in a law enforcement agency could see current crimes in real-time, 
while simultaneously seeing specific threads pertaining case management, developing 
intelligence trends, and have an overlay of potential offenders; then it seems that 
opportunities may avail themselves for solutions at a faster rate. This moves away from a 
centralized intelligence sharing and even beyond a decentralized platform into a fully 
distributed model. 
While the crime of burglary was the nexus for this analysis, the fact that the 
offenders operated in different neighborhoods and committed other offenses shows the 
need for investigators and other key personnel to be more aware of evolving situations in 
the community. 
For example, if the manager of the latent print process can see an emerging 
pattern, she can make a timely prioritization adjustment to process fingerprints more 
quickly on the original case. This requires all personnel to be dialed into a real-time 
situational awareness platform that synthesizes the current common operating picture 
with the ability to partition the information into manageable amounts of data. This can be 
done either geo-spatially or temporally for the best digestion and response. 
In closing, using a distributive information platform to generate better situational 
awareness that processes and is available in real-time creates a common operating picture 
that allows the best opportunity to solve new crimes quickly. By solving crimes faster, 
new crimes and victims are prevented. Preventing more crime allows for the re-allocating 
police work toward proactive efforts. The availability of those front line resources could 
possibly result in the apprehension of potential terrorists doing those precursor crimes as 








V. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Twenty-six United States cities were selected for this analysis. To correlate the 
cities’ crime with homeland security, the 26 selected were part of the nation’s Urban 
Area Security Initiative (UASI) Program.72  The three-year period selected was 2008 
through 2010, which corresponds to UASI fiscal years 2009–2011.73  The crime for the 
method and analysis was burglary, and the purpose of burglary, as discussed 
qualitatively, was a sample of the array of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform 
Crime Reporting Part One Index Offenses.74  Quantitatively, burglary and burglary 
arrests, as compared by city size and available policing resources was examined. This 
served as a barometer of city security health and investigative processes related to speed 
in a given calendar year, and a baseline for potential, supporting technological 
opportunities. While not quantitatively integrated into the data scoring, it was noted in the 
data collection which cities rely on processes familiar to modern law enforcement, 
processes such as CompStat, Predictive Policing, Smart Policing, and Intel-led Policing 
and also supporting technologies to analyze and solve crime.75 
With a focus on burglary arrest ratio (by percentage) to demonstrate an agency’s 
sub-focus on a property crime as a barometer of crime-health, a review of the national  
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statistics from 2008–2010 was done. This set a baseline of understanding prior to 
analyzing the 26 UASI cities. The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime 
Reporting Index was used for all three years.76 
In 2008, there were 2,042,369 reported burglaries nationwide, with estimated total 
arrests of 308,479 for that particular offense. The arrest percentage was 15.1 percent or 
one arrest for every 6.62 reported burglaries. In 2009, the offense increased over one 
percent nationwide for a total reported number of 2,063,466 with arrests estimated at 
299,351, which is just below a three percent drop. This lowered the arrest percentage to 
14.5 percent and yielded one arrest for every 6.89 burglaries. Lastly, 2010 burglaries 
nationwide dropped by over 37,000 reported offenses to 2,025,747, which translates to a 
reduction of 1.82 percent; however, arrests dropped again  to 289,769, which lowered the 
arrest percentage to 14.3 percent with a ratio of one arrest for every 6.99 burglaries 
within the calendar year. 
This data shows a three-year arrest percentage average of 14.63 percent and a 
ratio of one arrest for every 6.83 burglaries. While the arrest totals, as well as the 
percentages and ratios, decreased each year within 2008–2010 so did the overall crime of 
burglary. 
Consider Tampa, FL in the same analytical review. The city averaged a 23.33 
arrest percentage or one arrest for every 4.28 reported burglaries, which is almost 60 
percent higher than the nationwide average. While reported burglaries dropped from 
4,098 in 2008, to 3,501 in 2009 and to 3,131 by 2010; arrests also dropped from 923 in 
2008, to 776 in 2009, and had a slight increase to 780 in 2010. While the arrest 
percentage and ratio was better in 2010 than 2008, moving from 23 to 25 percent, it went 
against the national trend, which went down slightly (15.1 in2008; 14.5 in2009; and 14.3 
in2010) over the same three years. The key is to not let the efficiency rate (arrest 
percentage ratio) go down with the burglary rate so as to avoid a resurgence of the 
specific offense and potentially other crimes, including precursor crimes of terrorism.   
                                                 




All data for the following analysis was readily available in open source 
information either directly or indirectly connected to each agency, and this analysis did 
not meet the criteria for an Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the Naval Postgraduate 
School. 
B. AGENCIES 
Table 16 shows the 26 UASI agencies that were sampled for the quantitative 
analysis within 2008–2010: 
Table 16.   Urban Area Security Initiative Data Sample Agencies77 
 
C. POPULATION 
The 26 agencies and localities were first organized by city population. It was 
noted that on the lower end of city populations that the city of Orlando fell to the city of 
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Norfolk between 2008 and 2009 as the smallest city in the sampling. In addition, the city 
of Philadelphia exchanged places with the city of Phoenix between 2009 and 2010 for the 
second-largest city in the sample data. The city of Tampa remained steady in rank 
throughout the period. Tables 17, 18, and 19 show data for 2010, 2009, and 2008, 
respectively. 
There were a total of two cities that that remained below 250,000 (Orlando and 
Norfolk) within the data period. In addition, a total of 10 cities that remained above 
250,000 but below 500,000 (St. Paul, Riverside, Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Anaheim, Tampa, 
St. Louis, Minneapolis, Cleveland, and Miami). A total of nine cities that remained above 
500,000 but below one million (Atlanta, Portland, Washington, D.C., Denver, Seattle, 
Baltimore, Boston, Charlotte-Mecklenburg, and San Francisco). Moreover, five cities that 
remained over one million (San Diego, Las Vegas, Phoenix, Philadelphia, and Houston). 
Finally, the city of Tampa ranked the eighth smallest city by population for all three years 





Table 17.   2010 by Population78 
 
 
                                                 




Table 18.   2009 by Population79 
 
 
                                                 




Table 19.   2008 by Population80 
 
D. OFFICERS PER 1,000 
Upon reviewing officers per capita, the data set stayed relatively the same 
between the years of 2009 and 2010. In 2009 and 2010, there were five cities below 2.0 
officers per 1,000 residents; 12 cities settling above 2.0 but below 3.0 officers per 
1,00081. In addition, in 2009 and 2010, there were nine cities at or above 3.0 officers per 
1,000 residents. Washington, D.C., led the officer-to-resident ratio all three years with 
                                                 





6.81 in 2008; 6.76 in 2009; and 6.56 in 2010.82  Two cities fell from 3.0 officers per 
1,000 to below 3.0 per thousand between 2008 and 2009.83  Furthermore, San Francisco 
fell from 3.0 officers per 1,000 in 2008 to 2.92 officers per 1,000 in 2009. Additionally, 
Atlanta went from 3.04 officers per 1,000 from 2008 to 2.72 officers per 1,000 in 
2009and then bounced back in 2010 reaching 3.0 officers per 1,000 residents as 
compared to the previous year. The city of Tampa’s officer-to-citizen ratio was reduced 
by almost six percent between the years of 2008 and 2010. Tables, 20, 21, and 22 list the 
officers per 1,000 by UASI city for 2010, 2009, and 2008, respectively.  
Table 20.   Table 2010 Officers per 1,00084 
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Table 22.   2008 Officers per 1,00085 
 
E. CRIME RANKING 
Crime ranking within 2010, 2009, and 2008 was not within the selected (data) 
cities, but within the national rankings of all cities available.86  In 2010, there were nine 
(UASI) cities within the top 50 cities nationwide in highest crime. St. Louis, Cleveland, 
and Baltimore led each year respectively as the cities with the highest crime in the data 
set. In 2009 and 2008, two additional cities joined the other nine to be in the top 50 
nationwide for highest crime. The city of Miami made the cut both years for the top 50 
and the city of Houston made it in 2008, and the city of Pittsburg made it in 2009. 
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Four of the 26 cities remained in the top 50–100 ranking in 2010; however it 
increased to five cities in the previous years of 2009 and 2008. The years 2008 and 2009 
also showed nine cities holding the rankings in-between 100–200; that jumped to 11 for 
2010. Only two cities (Anaheim and San Diego) were ranked above 200 in 2010, but that 
was better than only one each year in 2009 and 2008—which proved to be Anaheim both 
years. 
The city of Tampa jumped from 105 in 2008, to 122 in 2009, settling at 155 by 
2010; showing an over 47 percent improvement within the three calendar years. Tables 
23, 24, and 25 show crime rankings for 2010, 2009, and 2008.  
Table 23.   2010 Crime Ranking87 
 
 
                                                 




Table 24.   2009 Crime Ranking88 
 
 
Table 25.   2008 Crime Ranking89 
 
 
                                                 





F. BURGLARY RATE 
Beyond assessing UASI cities in the sampling—which would those jurisdictions 
having greater homeland security risk—the core data was centered on the UCR Part One 
Offense of Burglary. Each city was measured for both their total reported burglaries and 
their total burglaries per 1,000 residents for the years of 2010, 2009, and 2008. As 
described in the qualitative analysis chapter, burglary would be those offenses that met 
the UCR Part One definition for reporting, above the state statute for the affected 
locality.90 
In 2010, 13 UASI cities, led by Anaheim, were under 10 burglaries per 1,000 
residents. This was better than 12 in 2009 and 10 in 2008. Respectively, there were 12 
UASI cities in-between 10 and 20 burglaries in 2010 per 1,000, which was one city better 
than the 13 in 2009, and two better than the 14 cities in 2008. One city, Cleveland had 
over 20 burglaries per 1,000 residents in 2010 and 2009, but was joined by St. Louis in 
2008. 
The city of Tampa progressed from 12.16 burglaries per 1,000 residents in 2008, 
down to 9.0 burglaries per 1,000 residents in 2010an improvement of 25 percent within 
the subsequent two years or approximately three less burglaries per 1,000 residents. This 
moved the city of Tampa from eighteenth in 2008 to tenth lowest within the studied cities 
within the time line. 
Tables 26, 27, and 28 give burglary rates for 2010, 2009, and 2008, respectively.  
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Table 27.   2009 Burglary Rate91 
 
 
                                                 




Table 28.   2008 Burglary Rate92 
 
G. BURGLARY ARREST RATIO 
Ultimately, the focus of the quantitative analysis is on this metadata. This is not 
case-closing data, but specifically the number of burglary arrests made against the 
number of burglaries that were reported via the FBI’s UCR Part One Index, regardless of 
the association or disassociation to each case. Specifically, while we know each burglary 
occurred in a specific year and the total arrests happened in the same calendar year—it 
does not mean that the arrest is directly connected with burglaries that occurred in the 
identified year. What it does mean is that a burglar was arrested, and it can theoretically 
be associated with:  
 
 
                                                 




1. The cities’ burglary rate per 1,000 residents,  
2. Their overall crime ranking and  
3. Potentially a component of the cities’ overall crime and homeland security 
health. 
In 2008, there were eight cities that had less than a 10 percent arrest ratio to 
reported offenses, as compared to nine in years 2009 and 2010. The year 2008 also had 
13 UASI cities sitting between 10 and 20 percent, while 2009 had 12 and 2010 had 11. 
While both 2008 and 2009 showed five cities that were above a 20 percent arrest-to-
report ratio for burglary, only 2010 had data for three cities, as Riverside and Phoenix did 
not have the arrest totals available for the given year. The city of Tampa improved from 
an arrest ratio of 23 percent in 2008, to 25 percent in 2010 or an arrest in one of every 
four burglaries that occurred that year.   





Table 29.   2010 Burglary Arrest Ratio93 
 
                                                 




Table 30.   2009 Burglary Arrest Ratio94 
 
  
                                                 




Table 31.   2008 Burglary Arrest Ratio95 
 
H. CORRELATIONS 
Upon reviewing the metadata within the sample jurisdictions, the analytical 
purpose was to demonstrate a correlation between local crime-health by using a ratio of 
burglary related arrests within a given calendar year as a barometer of speed and 
investigative efficiency. This last data sort was designed to filter each agency first for 
crime ranking; then burglary arrest ratio; then finally overall burglary rate. 
1. Burglary Arrest Ratio and Crime Ranking 
From 2008 to 2010, no city that ranked in the top 100 for crime had a burglary 
arrest ratio that reached 20 percent. The best city in 2010 was Baltimore with a 
17 percent burglary arrest ratio and ranked number 11 in crime, followed by Philadelphia 
and Pittsburgh having a 16 percent burglary arrest ratio. The two cities have crime 
rankings of 70 and 82, respectively. 





Using the same approach for 2009, Baltimore had the top burglary arrest rate for a 
city ranking in the top 100 for overall part one UCR crime. Three cities in the top 100 for 
crime reached a 15 percent burglary arrest rate: St. Louis, ranking number two in the 
nation for overall part one UCR crime that year; Cincinnati ranking nineteenth in the 
nation; and San Francisco holding the position of ninety-third. 
Baltimore, in 2008, had a 17 percent burglary arrest ratio and held the overall, 
part one UCR crime rank of twelfth in the U.S. Philadelphia’s burglary arrest ratio was 
16 percent, but its crime ranking was 22. St. Louis was ranked number four in the U.S. 
for overall, part one96 UCR crime, but managed to have a 15 percent arrest ratio for the 
year. 
The cities between 2008 and 2010 that reached a 20 percent or higher burglary 
arrest ratio were as follows. 
a. 2010 
In 2010, San Francisco had a 35 percent arrest ratio and a crime ranking of 
130. Additionally, Tampa had a 25 percent arrest ratio and a crime ranking of 155 while 
San Diego had a 23 percent arrest ratio and a crime ranking of 221. Finally, Anaheim had 
a 32 percent burglary arrest ratio with a nationwide, part one UCR crime ranking of 280. 
It should be noted that both Phoenix and Riverside had no burglary arrest data available 
for this calendar year, but they ranked 135 and 191 in overall crime with a burglary rate 
of 10.12 per 1,000 and 6.85 per 1,000. 
b. 2009 
In 2009, the cities that had 20 percent or better in burglary arrest ratios 
within the calendar year were: Boston, with 20 percent and a crime ranking of 104; 
Tampa, with a 22 percent burglary arrest ratio and a part one UCR crime rank of 122; 
Riverside, with a 25 percent arrest ratio and a crime rank of 174; and, finally, San Diego 
                                                 




and Anaheim, having a burglary arrest ratio of 23 and 32 percent, while holding the crime 
rankings of 191 and 268, respectively. 
c. 2008 
In 2008, the best cities in the earliest sample year of 100 and better in 
overall, part one UCR crime ranking in the U.S. were: Boston, with a burglary arrest ratio 
of 20 percent and holding the number 100 spot; San Francisco,  having an arrest ratio of 
21 percent and a crime ranking of 102; Tampa, having an arrest ratio of 23 percent and a 
crime ranking of 105; San Diego, having an arrest ratio of 20 percent and a crime ranking 
of 184; and, finally, Anaheim, with an arrest ratio of 32 percent and a national crime 
ranking in that year of 236. 
d. Anomalies 2008–2010   
In 2010, Seattle and Portland had good crime rankings of 157 and 174, 
respectively, yet only had a burglary arrest ratios of eight and nine percent, respectively. 
Denver also was in this anomalistic net with a 13 percent burglary arrest ratio but held a 
respectable crime ranking of 141. In addition, Norfolk with a five percent burglary arrest 
ratio held the nation’s 105 spot for 2009, followed by St. Paul with a nine percent arrest 
ratio and a 112 crime ranking. Both Portland and Seattle showed an eight and six percent 
arrest ratio for burglary but managed to be at 173 and 183, respectively, in overall, part 
one UCR crime. Again, Portland and Seattle in 2008 show an arrest ratio of below 10 
percent in burglary for the year (nine and five percent), while holding the positions of 141 
and 165 nationwide as it pertains to overall part one UCR crime for the year. 
Resorting back to the nationwide burglary data, it is noted that only eight 
UASI cities were above the national arrest percentage and ratio in 2010, with nine in 
2009, and 10 in 2008. It is this loss of efficiency momentum that a technological support 
system could potentially help to prevent. 
One common denominator within these anomalies, (although not married 
with scientific data) as it relates to those cities with relatively lower crime rates (>100 




(speculatively) have an impact on overall crime, as compared to a city like Tampa, which 
has a sub-tropical climate year round making it seasonally ripe to do crime all 12 months 
in addition to combating tourism influx. 
Table 32.   2010 Sorted by Crime Ranking; Then Burglary Arrest Ratio; Then Burglary 
Rate97 
 
                                                 








Table 34.   2008 Sorted by Crime Ranking; Then Burglary Arrest Ratio; Then Burglary 
Rate99 
 
                                                 





I. ANALOGOUS CASE STUDY 
While there are dissimilarities between professional sports and crime in a 
community, some things are similar; although not necessarily tangibly described or 
quantified. Those that have played or coached organized sports understand the mystery of 
momentum as it relates to the opponent. This same momentum can be felt in the crime 
fight when there is a strong sense of mission and performance. Momentum, quantified 
into performance, results is the focus of this illustration. 
In an attempt to quantify team or performance success within a playing season, 
certain team statistics were examined as a comparison model to how a law enforcement 
agency responds to burglary as a sub-statistic of performance success. The data sample 
came from the National Football League (NFL) between 2008 and2010, which matches 
the calendar years that the crime statistics. The NFL statistics focus on the teams in for 
the Super Bowls since those teams prevailed in each of the conferences (National and 
American).100 
Each team was examined for its final ranking in both offensive and defensive 
performance in only one statistic each. Yards gained (offense performance) and yards 
against (defensive performance) seemed to be the best barometer of final standings by 
overall performance. The hypothesis is that a team making it to the Super Bowl had to 
have a relatively high ranking in offensive play, defensive standings, or both. 
At the close of the 2008 season, the Pittsburgh Steelers squared up to the Arizona 
Cardinals for the Super Bowl. Pittsburgh finished number one in defense for least amount 
of yards against (3,796)101, and Arizona finished number four in offense gaining 5,852 
yards among all 32 teams.102  Following the 2009 season, the New Orleans Saints, who 
were number one in offense yardage gained with 6,461, played the Indianapolis Colts 
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who finished in the top 10 of offense with 5,800 total yards gained.103  Lastly, the Green 
Bay Packers played the title game against the Pittsburgh Steelers in 2010, and Green Bay 
finished in the top 10 of both offense (5,730 yards gained) and (4,946 allowed gainst), 
while Pittsburgh ranked number two in defensive play only allowing a total of 4,430 
yards against.104 
The purpose of this short and analogous study was to illustrate the results-based 
data within a larger complex adaptive system such as the NFL football season. Crime, 
too, is especially complex in its adaptive and evolving environment. Although football 
has more rules and regulations within its realm of competitive play than an open society, 
things such as player injuries, weather, pre-game travel fatigue, etc., can mimic some of 
the complex and adaptive or evolving conditions of a law enforcement agency trying to 
win the crime battle. If an agency focuses on the core tenets of reducing crime, then it is 
also possible to allocate that proactive work effort gained to thwart precursor acts of 
terrorism. Whether the fundamentals are gaining yardage, defending yards against, or 
reducing burglary, it all parlays into performance results for the team or community. 
A way to help achieve those results is to implement a distributed and real-time 
situational awareness solution to give all crime fighters a common operating picture and 
sense-making capable application. 
 
  
                                                 









SION CONCEPT RECOMMENDATION ONE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Despite the national downward trend in both violent (five-year trend 2006–2010 
showing a 13.2 percent reduction)105 and property crime (five-year trend 2006–2010 of a 
9.3 percent reduction)106 police officers are artificially handicapped in their ability to 
quickly resolve and prevent crimes because of the lack of up-to-the-moment information. 
Currently, there are limited or no effective methods to facilitate real-time communication 
within a police department, between agencies, and to community members. Because of 
this, the delay between the actual commission of the crime, the police response, and 
processing and recording of information and intelligence results in slower resolutions. 
B. ACRONYM DEFINED AS A PROCESS 





SION, which translates to: Validation, Visualization (V
2
), Information, Intelligence 
(I
2




SION is to 
enable readily accessible real-time communication between officers and agencies; real-
time mapping of crime occurrences and real-time recording of intelligence in order to 
promote informed tactical decisions; increase the swiftness of resolution; and prevent and 
reduce crime. The strategy-to-process was inspired on the front line from those best 
practices that evolved over the past nine years (2002–2011) of crime reduction within the 
Tampa Police Department; crime reduction which reached over 64 percent.107  As the 
best practices grew, the gaps and inconsistencies became more and more apparent; this 
was the information-transfer loss-rate, which equated to a loss of speed. Criminals thrive 
when law enforcement does not share information quickly enough or at all. 
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SION concept is designed to reduce and prevent crime by providing 




SION model is based on the 
following core components described below. 
1. Validation  
Each reported event must be validated as a crime. The pursuit of intelligence 
related to unverified events is an inefficient use of police resources. 
To elaborate on validation, once an officer responds and verifies that an offense 
has occurred, there is typically a delay before the crime put into an official report and 
becomes an icon on a map. Actually, the days of making a physical pin map in a police 
commander’s office was more real-time, it just was not shared very well—mimicking a 
centralized information and intelligence model. Many supporting technologies offer this 
capability after the records management and analytical processing. However, if an officer 
has verified a crime has occurred, he or she can place it on the map immediately to begin 
geo-spatial awareness and effective case management.   
This would be analogous to triaging a new patient in the emergency room and 
verifying they need to see a doctor except that the patient would be made visible to the 
entire emergency room staff all at once, and anyone with the capability could attend the 
patient immediately. It also speaks to the subjectivity and speed factors within a 
supporting technology discussed in the literature review. Additionally, it addresses the 
situational awareness and sense-making in one common operating space. By immediately 
posting a crime worthy of crowdsourcing a solution, it decreases the lag time of waiting 
for a report to be written, reviewed, and made into a map. Potential patterns can be 
discerned immediately and symptoms of the crime pattern can be seen and the sense-
making process can occur. Data subjectivity through human decisions to share or not to 
share becomes less of an issue since all personnel are working on the same crime fighting 




2. Visualization  
Through the creation of icons of each validated crime event, end-users can 
visualize geographical crime patterns and hot-spots in real time. 
Beyond the obvious, it is not simply the fact that crimes are electronically posted 
by the originating officer for instant visual awareness, but it is more importantly about 
geo-ownership. By posting validated crime and launching a case management flow, it 
creates a heuristic that can immediately engage other line and latent personnel who can 
work to solve an offense in a speedier fashion. Faster case awareness can lead to faster 
solutions and less crime by the same offender. Most agencies train their officers to be 
responsible for a particular geographical area, typically referred to as a beat or zone. By 
validating and visualizing a new crime on their own, it can exude a level of area and 
individual accountability that says, “I need to make this community I am responsible for 
safe.” 
The issue of people thinking in pictures and a real-time map visualizing offenses 
in various layers by crime type (e.g., robbery, burglary, auto theft) has been previously 
discussed. Also discussed is the fact that putting a spatial and temporal configuration 
begins the sense-making and seeing process.   
Consider the following: A new burglary is reported, validated, and posted onto the 
map, and the historical burglary layer is turned on and shows that an arrest was made 18 
months earlier of a defendant using a similar modus operandi and the offender layer 
shows he is out of jail and living nearby. All this can lend itself to information to get 
investigative traction on the case. Without this technology, an officer or detective would 
have to rely solely on his or her experiences, in that particular community, use subjective 
data mining, and/or fishing expedition to find a suspect. The best part of this technology 
is that when officers and detectives get promoted, reassigned or retire, the data stays in 
place. This creates the artificial experience process. Even better, it stays in place when 
the same officers and detectives go off shift or off work cycle (days off) and grows more 
when they return to work—all visually available in real-time. No more meetings, no more 




data—all at the fingertips of an end user’s hand-held, in-car or desktop device and 




SION offers.  
3. Information  
More efficient policing involves speedier sharing of information. A delay in the 
records management systems (RMS) “cools” the case. 
As written earlier, the founding fathers of CompStat converted the old culture of 





SION concept, as a process, allows CompStat to become the social media 
progression through information exchange iterations versus writing to read the perfect 
newspaper a day later. 
As information comes in by geography, active investigations, tasking, etc., it is 
putting metaphorical balls in the air to latch on to in order to make sense of policing in a 
particular time and space. Using a blog format, which is savvy for the newer officer 
generation, those pieces of information that have traditionally gone home in an 
investigator’s back pocket are now left on a technological platform for all personnel to 
see. As Mintzberg conveyed about seeing behind to see the way ahead, see laterally to 
see more vertically; and see below to see above—all requires implementing these “points 
of view,” which allows the information to be seen through.108 
Whether a blog is about a particular issue in a neighborhood or a particular case, it 
again gets likened to multiple doctors seeing a single patient and knowing what the 
previous treatments or prescriptions were to make sure that it is working in benefit of the 
patient. Well, if the community or a particular victim is the “patient” of law enforcement, 
they would want our police and detective “doctors” sharing information in real-time for 
the best opportunities and de-confliction available. 
Re-mentioning the information subjectivity matter, by blogging crime issue in 
real-time jurisdictional-wide, it helps to remove that risk that a commander or supervisor 
                                                 




unintentionally withheld an important piece of data that could solve a case or save a life. 
The “I thought you knew” or “nobody took ownership because everyone thought 
someone else was going to do it” factors diminish with real-time information sharing. 
4. Intelligence  
Intelligence develops over time and across shifts. A smarter way to police is to 
communicate information driven intelligence across deployments, supervision, and 
command structures, also in a real time format. 
As data and information churns in systems thinking environment, it gets honed 
into intelligence. That intelligence becomes premium information that is made available 
to the front line troops getting the job done. Many law enforcement cultures want to 
protect information-to-intelligence because it is special information. While that special 
information does occasionally need to be protected for the benefit of the case, hoarding it 
can also lead to the demise of the community and officer safety. Officers, deputies, and 
troopers in the field need not only to access real-time information and intelligence, they 
need to be able to post it immediately and leave it for the next shift or work cycle. By 
posting crime bulletins, intelligence bulletins, wanted bulletins, officer safety bulletins, 
and other jurisdictional bulletins in the same common operating space, which also 
contains crime maps and informational blogs that are all made visual into layers, allows 
the real-time, crime fighting synthesis to occur. 
Re-quoting Dr. Dervin’s sense-making definition of knowledge as being the sense 
made at a particular point in time-space by someone who converts the “knowledge” to 
intelligence, and the “someone” to law enforcement personnel in need of the real-time 
intelligence.109  It doesn’t matter whether an agency is using an intelligence-led policing 
method, a place-based or offender-based policing method or even predictive analysis 
tools, it all has to roll up into intelligence at some point and have the opportunity to be 
shared for action. 
                                                 




Linking the maps and associated data layers with the information (informal) blog 
space and the intelligence (formal) features and keeping them intertwined in one 
situational awareness platform allows the line, supervisory, and command personnel to 
all be on the same page of the crime battlefield full-time. It should be noted here that this 
concept is considered mostly an informal documentation technological sharing platform 
and does not supplant or replace for formal records keeping or intelligence 
documentation requirements. What it does do, however, is replace unopened emails, 
selected audience text-messaging, scribbled notes on a pocket pad, and the overall gap of 
information sharing that occurs between law enforcement personnel and agencies. 
5. Solution  
Reducing crime involves finding holistic immediate, mid-range, and long-term 
solutions. This can be done with immediate arrests and proactive, offender management. 
Solving crime to prevent future crime and re-allocate law enforcement energy to 





concept. Merriam Webster Dictionary’s definition of solution is, “An action or process of 
solving a problem.”110  The process of solving crime and terrorism seems to have a much 





SION concept and process recommendation not only brings more pieces to the table, 
it keeps track of where they are interplaying with each other. By example, if the forensics 
supervisor is in the same technological situational awareness space that the frontlines are 
working, he or she can see the immediate need to process the evidence in a priority, 
which could potentially bring information to the level of intelligence by making a 
fingerprint on a known offender and thus assisting in an apprehension of an offender. 
While case closure by arrest is effective, it is not the entire, or even the best 
solution. It’s really only a mitigation. However, while the mitigation via arrests and 
prosecution occurs in the crime fight, other solutions based on having all information and 
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intelligence at hand can start to create preventative solutions by getting ahead of a 
potential property or violent offense. If an officer blogs about a threat she has overheard 
by doing good ground work in her zone, and the next shift officer reads the blog at the 
start of his shift and uses his sources to thwart the offense—than that is the ultimate 
solution.  
6. Post-resolution Intelligence  
Continued post-resolution intelligence within and across agencies increases 
police effectiveness for crime reduction and public safety maintenance in the city and the 
entire region. 
Quite often, the arrest or interrogation debriefing intelligence stays with the 
investigator to shore up the case for prosecution. If the investigator posts this in the way 
of a post-arrest intelligence brief, then there is a better potential of making connections to 
other unsolved cases in the community and contiguous or regional community. If a 
detective arrests someone with a unique firearm, say one with white tape on the grip, and 
a previous robbery victim’s interview revealed that a month earlier he was robbed and 
recalls a gun with a white handle, a connection potentially be made in the common 
operating picture or even researched by querying all technological feature. 
Everyone arrested or interrogated should be interviewed as if he or she could be 
arrested again in the future. If the criminologists are true, then it only makes sense to 
share the de-briefed intelligence of the 20 percent that commit 80 percent of the crime. 
7. Optimization  
Aggregating the previous processes provides the most optimal and cost 
effective solutions for effective policing. 
By working in one, situational awareness, common operating picture for all law 
enforcement personnel the big data can be shared in distributed style versus centralized or 




spider, or centralized model, all personnel essentially become their own analysts.111  No 
more store front analytical or canned processes. All data is a metaphorical farm waiting 
for the information to be cultivated into actionable intelligence by the people getting the 
job done.   
It allows a quasi-leaderless policing model to commence to combat a leaderless 
criminal enterprise. 
8. Next  
Policing requires being prepared for and aware of what is coming next. 




SION loop. Getting the flywheel moving or creating game 
changing momentum is required to combat crime well. While having a zero crime rate is 
too idealistic, it can remain a vision. Offenders are going to cycle in and out of jail; they 
are going age-out or grow up, and meanwhile the attrition of most law enforcement 
agencies create a culture to work harder instead of smarter. There sadly will always be 
the next crime, the next offender, and next deployment, tactic or strategy to combat the 
unavoidable next attack out in the community. 
By maintaining visualized, layered information and intelligence is real-time, as 
well as maintaining the historical in a manipulated solution, the next doesn’t seem as 
fearful. The more the crime fighting team takes on and successfully conquers as a crowd 
instead  the former silo-based processes, not only can crime be reduced to reveal that 
proactive time to disrupt other activities such as precursory acts of terrorism, but it can 
also make for a less stressful working environment for the officers. 
In his book, Righteous Mind, Jonathan Haidt speaks of people binding together 
and forming groups to conquer real or metaphorical evil.112  Whether binding together to 
cheer on their favorite team, build a home for the needy or to crush crime, if this theory is 




SION concept process gives this unique 
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common operating picture to bind information into intelligence and make it available in 
real-time. 





SION model could be implemented on the ground using innovative 
software program that creates “virtual notebooks” of information. Evidence from the 
Tampa Police initiatives suggests that finding solutions to crimes would be swifter if the 
time from the incident occurrence to recording, mapping, and making the intelligence 
available to the agency were quicker. Therefore, a technology to record information and 
intelligence and map criminal events in the police car or at the crime scene can be 
utilized. Officers will be able to enter information into data management blogs, review, 
and search blog entries by counterparts, create reports, and reference data using mapping 




SION concept, these “virtual notebooks” of information 
incorporate real-time mapping and visualization of crime incidents, on-the-spot incident 
reporting, and instantaneous blogging (recording) of gathered intelligence (that can be 
shared in real-time). The added functionality to already utilized technology also saves 
money.  
Once the crime is validated, it is mapped and the relevant information posted to a 
case management blog attached to the plotted crime dot. This “hot” data (versus post-
RMS cold data) is now in the line of sight for all TPD personnel to see and act upon. This 
strategy is beneficial in three explicit ways:  
1. Officers have access to data related to the case quicker;  
2. The reporting officer can communicate with a greater number of 
investigators and officers; and  
3. Redundant tasking is minimized.  
As an example, the investigation into a late night offense may transcend officer 




SION concept to document the investigation as it is happening, 
the oncoming shift officers can avoid repeatedly visiting residential addresses because 









SION concept system immediately. This has an additional benefit of 
enhancing community trust because officers are not perceived as harassing and 






VII. RECOMMENDATION TWO CASE STUDY: SITUATIONAL 
AWARENESS FOR ENFORCERS’ COMMON OPERATING 
PICTURE (SAFECOP) 
A. INTRODUCTION 





SION. It actualizes the sharing process within a technological platform, 
which allows the real-time situational awareness within a common operating picture to 
offer the sense-making space for law enforcement. It becomes the technological 
opportunity of the form to create the functionality of crime fighting. 
A beta-deployment of SAFECOP occurred during the 2012 Republican National 
Convention (2012 RNC) in Tampa, Florida. The premise of constructing a pilot-version 
of the solution was centered on the non-event deployment of the 2012 RNC. The city of 
Tampa has a strong sense of mission commencing with crime reduction and was losing 
two-thirds of its personnel, including many of the latent and analytical positions to the 
2012 RNC. The SAFECOP solution was constructed as an opportunity to maintain the 
crime fight while the national special security event was in operation. 
SAFECOP was installed via desktop and mobile computer for over 300 non-event 
officers, detectives, and managerial personnel throughout the city. The non-event 
operational period was eight days long. This was the period that the agency was in an 
emergency deployment to minimally cover calls for service while the vast majority of not 
only personnel, but talented personnel, were assigned to the 2012 RNC duties. 
During the five day period of the actual 2012 RNC event, total crime was reduced 
26 percent of FBI part one and part two crimes. The solution closed the gap of the normal 
processes that were temporarily unavailable while the 2012 RNC was taking place. 
B. DESIGN 









already here as Millennial or Generation Y or new law enforcement officers are coming 
in as Generation Z or Gamers, , while the Generation X and Baby Boomers are on the 





SION concept was born in a silo, but based on the need for more 
expeditious information sharing and better process flow, while the SAFECOP design 
emerged off of four cornerstones offered to a group of best practice, practitioners. This 
design-to-pilot was valuable because the actual solution was a technological wrapper 
based on the progressive evolution of systematically lowering crime in a fairly large city 
(Tampa) over a nine year period. It is hard to debate against building a system that 
fortifies the proven best practices and offers them in a real-time common operating 





at minimum it would provide more effective communication between the field, then 
managers and the analysts. 
Instead of trying to build a system from scratch, and force more licensing and 
infrastructure costs, the SAFECOP requirements were offered to two existing and in-
production technological solution companies. Products from these companies, NC4 and 
Digital Sandbox, were already purchased and being used and sustained in the Tampa Bay 
Urban Area Security Initiative (TB-UASI). The concept of using in-production 
technologies made sense and saved money. These technologies had the core attributes, in 
addition to development and licensing cost-savings and offered the ability to work in a 
daily technological solution that could be toggled into its primary purchased role to 
maintain an end-user familiarity. This has value versus leaving it on the metaphorical 
shelf pending its situational use in special events or emergency management.  
NC4’s solution, called E-Sponder, was developed for emergency management 
situational awareness and resource management.114  Both the company (NC4) and their 
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product (E-Sponder) were designed with end user flexibility rather than typical 
technological rigidity. E-Sponder was purchased after a bout of hurricanes in the Tampa 
Bay area after 2004, and the primary solution based in Microsoft’s SharePoint was 
morphed to be Incident Command System/National Incident Management System 
friendly by implementing an event planning module. The concept of using the event 
module was a fortuitous consequence, and while the original intention was to bring daily 
operations like planned special events into the post-9/11 local law enforcement 
workspace to be seamless between events and emergencies; this process also became the 
seedling for the future solution of SAFECOP. 




SION process was simultaneously introduced to two 
existing solutions, one being NC4’s E-Sponder., The other, which was Digital Sandbox’s 
Site Profiler, was hoped to be the analytical engine that powered the Sense-making 
algorithms to connect potential offenders to crimes within the concept. Digital Sandbox 
was also developed, purchased, and sustained for the TB-UASI shortly after 9/11, and it, 
too, evolved into much more than a risk tool for critical infrastructure and key 
resources.115  Site Profiler appeared to be the perfect marriage partner to E-Sponder with 
boost the human investigators’ algorithms toward eventual computations and display the 
sense-making results to the variable metadata generated by the end users. 
Both solutions working side-by-side for many years, servicing the planned and 
unplanned events and incidents in the Tampa Bay region. This was coupled with a three-




SION conceptual discussion. Despite all this, the mutual business 
requirements could never be established to create the full pilot. The 2012 RNC proved to 
be the most viable scenario for both funding and beta-deployment, and because the co-
development round-tables could not create the mutual scope-of-work agreeable to all 
parties, the project was limited to NC4 to develop the SAFECOP solution. This did 
nothing to preclude future integration between the two, or allowing a technology 
                                                 




developer to fully construct a solution on its own platform as a module or completely 
from the metaphorical ground up. 
The program designed for the 2012 RNC had to be done in agile format because it 
had to be fully deployed for the event period. After the development of the requirements 
and creating the project scope-of-work, there was approximately five months to finalize 
and deploy. Working through one technological vendor proved to be the most efficient 
process for the 2012 RNC and essentially the beta for the post-RNC complete roll out. 
The city of Tampa’s Technology and Innovation Department (T&I), which 
already having its hands full with other 2012 RNC supporting technology and cyber 
security implementations, had to provide a secure Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) feed 




SION process to commence by 
allowing the officer/investigator to validate a crime, which launches the information and 
intelligence functions, as well as the case management. This now remains to be the 
computer-generated algorithmic-gap in the program, which currently requires human 




SION concept is designed to 
make offender-crime correlations to improve investigative speed and provide artificial 
experience. This occurs by mapping and weighting the metadata between entries like 
crime type, location, modus operandi against offender descriptions and footprints, current 
jail or prison status and also modus operandi. 
The concept that when an officer is dispatched to a residential burglary for the 
CAD feed pre-populates certain information fields such as original dispatch call type, 
location, time, and date. Once an officer validates the crime is truly a legitimate burglary, 
she immediately uploads it to the map, one of the four technological cornerstones. The 
original call notes are either carried into the program by the CAD process or entered 
directly by the officer, which is preferred as another step of the validation process. The 
CAD process has to be compliant with the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Criminal 
Justice Information Services FBI-CJIS and other personal information requirements. The 




not have to be a CAD feed, and all the data elements for a validated offense can be 











Figure 2.  Homepage of SAFECOP 
If the solution is fortified with algorithmic computations, this is where the 
metadata match-ups would occur and present an informational return on known 
offenders. If the burglary occurred in a certain geographic, then the self-launching query 
would start identifying all offenders inside the solution that had previously worked that 
particular (community) footprint. The crime-offender mapping would continue to get 
refined based on witness input (e.g., if a witness said the offender appeared to be a 
juvenile and school was in session, those descriptors were entered). Beyond the 
description, if the previous arrest of a burglar included the modus operandi, which 
matched, then there would be better weighting of the potential match. Of course, and 
regardless of how well a correlation appeared, a sanity check and further investigation 
would be required to develop a circumstantial case. Absent the algorithmic feature, which 
is the current SAFECOP pilot, correlations have to be made via investigator algorithms 
based on experience and known offender analysis applied by hand. 
Whether the human-based or computation-based algorithms are a part of the 




SION process is to place it in real-
time on the map. This allows the offenses to be visualized in spatial and temporal 
perspective immediately. There is no need to wait for delayed records management data 





Figure 3.  Map Cornerstone One (1) 
 
Figure 4.  Map Cornerstone One (2) 
Once the crime is validated and visualized, the next programmatic, or second 





SION process, this allows space for information and intelligence to grow 
toward a solution. Using the burglary example, best practice efforts are efforts that 
progress toward a solution. These efforts include efforts such as conducting a 
neighborhood survey and posting the results, itemizing the forensic steps such as DNA or 
fingerprint collection and processing, and checking pawn shops or pawn technology for 
any stolen property. These steps can be viewed by detectives and supervisors to offer the 
best opportunity against investigative time delays and preventing additional victims. In 
addition, the technology can be alarmed inside the solution to send an email to text 
message to the internally interested personnel when new information is added. As each 
person with responsibilities makes a blog entry, it is analogous of different doctors caring 
for the same patient, adding curing measures. They do this all while de-conflicting the 





Figure 5.  Case Management Cornerstone Two 
Simultaneous to the visualization layers of crime icons and correlating offenders, 
as well as case management, is the development of various types of bulletins (third 
cornerstone) for real-time situational awareness. These bulletins can be made in the field 
immediately by on-scene investigators, as well as read and queried by any data element. 
Reverting back to the burglary investigation, if a surveillance video availed itself for a 
suspect vehicle and offender, the video can be paused and photographed with a cell 
phone, emailed to the officer who the uploads it into a crime bulletin in a matter of 
minutes. Once the crime bulletin is constructed, it can be converted into another icon with 
map coordinates to show the correlation on the main map layer. Bulletins can be 







Figure 6.  Bulletins Third Cornerstone 
The final cornerstone is open geo-blogging about areas of responsibility. 
Essentially, for any valid policing purpose, blogs can launch a thread of information and 
lead toward intelligence in real-time at the street level. There is no loss in interpretation 
by the bloggers as they eliminate any of the former, middle analytical filters. It also 
leaves the information and intelligence available for the next shift, work cycle, or 
generation that works that area. This defines the artificial experience discussed earlier. If 
an officer or detective gets re-assigned to a new area, the information, and intelligence 
equity remains in that geographical space. It does not go home on a pocket pad, it does 




left out in a supervisory briefing. This exemplifies the section in the literature review that 




Figure 7.  Blogs Fourth Cornerstone 
As these four cornerstones—validation and visualization, case management, 
bulletin management, and blogging— are all synthesized into one common operating 
picture and generating human or computation-based correlations. They work toward 
reducing crime. By reducing crime, it allows a local agency to convert reactive and 
investigation time into proactive policing, which creates opportunities for disrupting 





information being consumed and processed, street level human intelligence is being 
managed in real-time. Moreover, it creates in-field fusion where the job is getting 
accomplished. 
C. UTILIZATION CASE STUDY 
As discussed earlier, the pilot version of SAFECOP was deployed in conjunction 
with the 2012 RNC as technology to reinforce the remaining limited personnel and 
functionalities that were left to manage non-event policing for a period of eight 
consecutive (including five main event NSSE days). Over 300 personnel were registered 
into the system, including all patrol, skeleton plain clothes and detective squad, and the 
remaining street level managers. The beta solution was void of data as it rolled out with 
empty crime, blogs, bulletins, and offenders. The only data was the information placed 
into the program over the eight days of police effort. 
Each officer and beyond had in-car access to the SAFECOP solution, and by the 
end of the eight days, the information and intelligence sharing was rampant. The threads 
were not only professional, but they were all pertinent and required very little guidance. 
The solution was very law enforcement intuitive and required only registration and 
nomenclature training. Total crime was measured against the same five days of 2011, and 
crime was reduced over 26 percent within the FBI’s part one and part two offenses. 
Shortly after the 2012 RNC concluded, on September 5, 2012, an officer 
responded to a commercial burglary. While investigating the commercial burglary, the 
officer was able to view a surveillance video that showed a picture of the suspect. The 
officer photographed the paused video and created a bulletin in the SAFECOP solution. 
Several hours later an officer saw the suspect wearing the same clothes the suspect in the 
video. The suspect was detained, and after a consensual search, items taken in the recent 
burglary, including building keys, were located in his possession. It is this type of real-
time situational awareness that brought a speedy solution to the case and potentially 




crime, more time for proactive policing and potentially disrupting those precursor crimes 
associated with planning and executing terrorism. 
D. RECOMMENDATION TWO CONCLUSION 





process, while exciting in the 2012 RNC pilot roll-out, offered plenty of opportunity for 
adjustments prior to solidifying the 1.0 version. In less than a month of the pilot, over 40 
line items of end-user fixes were submitted to the vendor. These requests validated that 
SAFECOP was a solution designed for the progress the agency made in the crime 
reduction processes and not some off-the-shelf technology that would theoretically work. 
Good policing drove the design, not the other way around. 
The key to the initial roll-out was seeing the self-organizing communication 
without any need for direction. The line personnel simply started using the tool and 
within 60 days, crime bulletins increased 100 percent from the year earlier. What was 
more important than the sheer number of crime bulletins was the readership. Bulletins 
formally generated in email would get lost in the queue, especially over days off, and not 
get opened. Now due to the ability to sort by geography, it eliminates the theory of too-
much information and each officer, detective, supervisor, manager, and analyst can 
isolate as much or as little information as necessary to make the necessary tactical 
correlations. 
Additional development will be in the form of mobile applications, where 
potentially each cornerstone— map, case management, bulletins and blogging—can have 
its own application interface back to the entire solution. This would allow foot patrol 
officers, and possibly even military ground forces, to have situational awareness on a 
smaller, mobile device and also make inputs of the same data as one could on a desktop 





VIII. FURTHER RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES 
A. RECOGNITION HEURISTICS 
Examination of speed in the battlefield as it relates to situational awareness can 
also prompt additional work into the area of recognition heuristics (RH). While there 
have been studies done by Daniel Goldstein and Gerd Gigerenzer; Daniel Oppenheimer; 
B.R. Newell, D. Fernandez, and T. Richter; and P. Späth116 relating to RH, there may be 
a correlation to RH as it pertains to situational awareness, especially Dervin’s Sense-
making.117  It might be possible, even at the user-interface design level, to layout the 
information to allow better absorption by the end user in initiating a crowdsourcing field-
approach to solving crime and preventing terrorism. This could be done by presenting the 
actionable data in a RH model for dealing in a complex-adaptive or complex-evolving 
system or society. 
B. ADVANCED ANALYTICS 
While computation-based algorithms are not new, additional research to their 
application into the role of crime fighting to create an artificial experience may have 
value. Most agencies have area of responsibility attrition, as well as change functional 
assignments many times within the span of a career. They shift bid to different 
geographic location, , or get promoted and re-assigned from general patrol operations to 
focused investigations such as property crimes, sex crimes, and homicide. By utilizing a 
common operating picture for a synthesis of collecting and distributing situational 
awareness information and intelligence, by the very people doing the collecting and 
sharing, computer-based correlations can be made of the metadata. This process, 
however, has to have a rules-of-evidence sanity check, but the use of advanced analytics 
to assist making data match-ups between historical offender profiles and new crimes can 
create a launching point to accelerate an investigation. 
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It is one thing to map, blog, create bulletins, and conduct case management inside 
on technological picture. It is another to create a program that develops a weighted, short-
listing of potential criminal offenders by geography, modus operandi, and criminal 
availability of whether they were in/out of jail/prison at the time of the new crime. This 
can accelerate the investigator’s tasking and checklists but, more importantly, standardize 
the initial approach regardless of the officers’ or investigators’ law enforcement and 
known offender experience. 
C. BIG DATA, NETWORK FUSION AND 28 CFR PART 23 
Assistant Chief Joseph W. Pfeifer of the New York City Fire Department wrote a 
timely article on “Network Fusion in Homeland Security Affairs.”118  There are 
definitely parallels between his discussion of network fusion and the objectives of 
Dervin’s SAFECOP pilot common operating picture and situational awareness solution. 
Even so, additional effort can be done to elevate the granularity of SAFECOP and yet 
drill down on network fusion. Simply stated, the SAFECOP model allows user-based 
formation and intelligence sharing by the ground troops for the ground troops. Network 
fusion offers a similar approach, but it is still at the fusion level of the overall challenge. 
The opportunity for more research may be in the realm that can a SAFECOP model be 
constructed for the strategic altitude of the fusion environment; and coupled with network 
fusion becoming more tactical and frontline driven so the field operators can have a more 
distributed model than a centralized, or even a decentralized platform for better 
asynchronous crime fighting and homeland security information sharing? Lastly, yet 




SION process, SAFECOP pilot or their equivalents—our 
most important role involves the protection of our constitutional rights as individuals.119 
Therefore, before a SAFECOP model can be deployed in a multijurisdictional setting, 
compliance with 28 CFR Part 23 must be observed.120 
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Information and intelligence sharing post-September 11, 2001 centered heavily in 
the disparate development of fusion centers nationwide as well as Joint Terrorism Task 
Force memberships. The disparate approach is not meant to be critical, but is meant to be 
the reality as the design and deliverables have shown to vary. . The fusion centers were in 
response to the 9/11 Commission Report that directed state and local law enforcement to 
have a more active role in protecting the homeland. It makes sense to have the vast 
majority of law enforcement resources working at ground levels to take holistic 
ownership of their community in a manner they can ultimately influence. Investigations 
of the fusion centers were claimed to offer shoddy investigative reports, breached privacy 
protections, and mismanaged grant funding.121 
In an article dated as recent as October 18, 2012, the United States Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) is touted for developing a DHS Common Operating Picture 
(DHS COP) project to create a unified situational awareness data platform.122  The 
solution is described as a public- and private cloud-based infrastructure that meshes data 
from partners. The article continues to refer to this DHS COP solution as mandated by 
law under the Homeland Security Act, and it offers a way to get information to the 
decision makers relating to terrorism and disasters. A COP and situational awareness is 
great, however, Sense-making is the next step, especially when combing through big and 
potentially disparate data. 
In-between the 9/11 Commission Report and the DHS COP, while the United 
States was trying to get our arms around terrorism risk at the federal, state, and local 
levels, the New York Police Department was moving toward closing a decade of 
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information and intelligence accountability in their CompStat process.123  This process 
was proliferated around the nation over the years and the culture of simply professional 
policing was moved into a business model. This practice was examined for increased 
rhythm and better situational awareness that will propel local crime fighting into the 
future. The demonstrated sense-making reality is that the most impact that the local law 
enforcement can have on terrorism is by staying in their effective working lane. A nexus 
has already been established by proximity data in the domestic terrorism arena that shows 
the precursor acts are relatively close to the intended targets. Whether or not precursor 
crimes are directly linked to the funding of international or domestic terrorism matters 
little if the offenders are being disrupted or apprehended and identified. 
An agency has a better opportunity to thwart these crimes if it has a good handle 
on daily, local crime. Reducing community crime, this allows time for proactive work to 
accomplish maintaining and advancing crime the realized crime reduction, and it allows 
time for proactive effort. This creates crime reduction momentum and allows the law 
enforcement agency to control the criminal element, not the other way around, which 
would be where the criminal element controls the community which includes the local 
law enforcement resources. 
By studying the crime of burglary, both qualitatively inside a single agency and 
quantitatively among 26 UASI agencies, specific analysis can be evaluated for process 
consistency and information sharing that can act barometrically for the rest of crime and 
homeland security. First, an agency that has realized beyond a 64 percent crime reduction 
and over a 56 percent reduction in burglary inside nine years must have not only 
processes and a sense of urgency in place but can also recognize those gaps when the 
processes and urgency are neglected. This approach, coupled with quantitatively 
analyzing 26 UASI agencies (also centered on the crime of burglary as an over-all 
measure of criminal health for a terrorism-risk-based community) provides a sense of 
showing importance on a property crime as an indicator of Sun Tzu speed and Dervin’s 
sense-making of information and intelligence.   
                                                 




Solve burglaries quickly, solve crime well. Solve crime well; prevent terrorism 
well. The opposite of doing these well can potentially be created or sustained with a 
strong, supporting technology. 
It has been relatively discussed that technology can offer an objective side to the 
subjective human. This can also be elevated to the technology and an agency or well 
beyond a single person. The aforementioned DHS COP is an example of trying to take 
disparate and subjectively shared information and provide an objective solution that 
allows an opportunity for another entity to benefit from the collective whole. While some 
people will occasionally refer to the old cliché of “too much information,”  it is only too 
much if it does not make sense. All sorts of sense-making filters and algorithms can be 
placed on the data to help make sense and decisions. 
The other part of any common operating picture based on situational awareness is 
the ability to distribute it. If the COP/SA is only at the strategic level of an organization, 
the entire objective-from-subjective part is lost. Whether data makes sense based on 
human algorithms or computations, it should be made as close to the problem as possible. 
The best place to have sense-making data is at the doorstep of the residential burglary, 
not a week later with cold, managerial filtered thoughts and actionable shavings. Keep 
the fresh, lively data, information, and intelligence in the field made by the field with the 
true sense-makers—the crime fighters. This approach was fortified by Major Stone’s 
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), discussing information dominance based on faster 
processing in the battlefield. 
One way an agency can help to sustain or gain on their crime reduction is to 





SION process and the SAFECOP pilot technology allowed the previous subjectivity 
of sharing to be in an objective environment where function follows form, and artificial 
experience can blossom. If an agency uses CompStat, Intel-led Policing, Predictive 




SION process contained in an SAFECOP model, 
it can only aid by allowing the line personnel to essentially see and share in real-time 
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